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TOO BIG TO FAIL:
MORAL HAZARD IN AUDITING AND THE NEED
TO RESTRUCTURE THE INDUSTRY BEFORE IT
UNRAVELS
Lawrence A. Cunningham*
Large audit firms may believe that they are too big
to fail. Arthur Andersen’s 2002 criminal indictment reduced
their number from five to four, and the government decided
in 2005 to avoid indicting KPMG for crimes it admitted
committing. If audit firms interpret the government’s
reluctance to indict as signaling aversion to tough action
against them, moral hazard arises. This offsets auditing
improvements mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
that are designed to strengthen auditors’ reputations with
managers for thoroughness and improve financial statement
reliability. Neutralizing this moral hazard requires a
credible alternative industry structure so that when a large
audit firm faces failure from criminal or other malfeasance,
it can be allowed to exit the industry without upsetting the
financial system that auditing supports.
An alternative industry structure must make auditing
at least as effective as it is under the current system and
should provide enhancements wherever possible. Examples
of enhancements include bolstering auditors’ reputations for
toughness with client managers and delivering more
transparent information to external users of financial
information. One way to restructure the industry along these
lines is through mandatory financial statement insurance.
Such insurance would make it clear that no audit firm is too
big to fail, promote strategic detection and deterrence in
auditing, produce publicly disclosed indices of financial
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statement reliability, and reduce barriers to entry that
potential competitors to the four large firms currently face.
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Introduction
The U.S. government sometimes rescues troubled enterprises
whose significance to the national or global economy renders them
“too big to fail.” Examples include the government-directed or
government-coordinated bailouts of Chrysler Corporation in the late
1970s and of Long Term Capital Management in the late 1990s.
Such intervention is controversial because the policy sustains a pillar
of the economy at the cost of creating moral hazard that encourages
excessive risk taking among organizations that consider themselves
too big to fail.
The government is aware of the moral hazard triggered by the
too big to fail doctrine, epitomized by banking laws that restrict its
use, and by the restraint it showed when allowing Arthur Andersen to
fail in 2002. Yet, having allowed Arthur Andersen to fail, the
auditing industry is now reduced in size to a historical low of four
firms that are competent to audit the vast majority of public
enterprises. Allowing another firm to fail would produce acute
industry concentration that would eliminate many clients’ choice of
auditors.
That prospect could precipitate the audit industry
unraveling and thus presents a high-magnitude loss risk that may
lead those firms to believe that they are too big to fail and the
government to agree. Such beliefs may be vindicated by how the
government in 2005 chose not to indict KPMG despite its admitted
federal crimes in peddling numerous illegal tax shelter schemes.
The probability of audit firm failure in the foreseeable future is
considerable, and industry members are able to influence this risk.
These facts and the temptation among audit firms to believe that they
are too big to fail compel developing mechanisms to counteract that
belief and its attendant moral hazard. Otherwise, the lax audits
characteristic of the late 1990s may continue, along with the
proliferation of unreliable financial statements that could lead to
cataclysmic liability judgments against a large audit firm. What is
needed is a credible alternative to the prevailing auditing industry
structure so that a firm facing failure can be allowed to exit without
disrupting the financial system that audit firms support. As the
5

following analysis explains, financial statement insurance can supply
this credible alternative.
Part I discusses the probability that one of the four large audit
firms will fail in the near future and the magnitude of such a failure.
The probability analysis highlights Professor Eric Talley’s innovative
model of risk that cautiously suggests that the probability of such a
failure is high; 1 it then extends the model’s implications by
explaining how this risk is within audit firms’ control. As to the
magnitude of an audit firm’s failure, the discussion shows how a
single large firm’s failure could unravel the auditing industry by
eliminating choice in the market for auditing services. Further, Part I
considers how the resulting governmental temptation to rescue a
failing firm creates moral hazard.
Part II draws insights from parallels between the model of
audit firm exit risk and catastrophic risk management tools
developed in complexity theory. These tools address the peculiar
features of complex dynamic systems in which even low-probability
events bear large-magnitude consequences.
Insights from
complexity theory adapted to auditing prescribe rebuilding impaired
auditor reputations with managers for toughness and with investors
for reliability. The first point leads to endorsing the controversial
audits of internal control required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
and promoting strategic methods of auditing practice. The second
point calls for auditors to perform and publicly disclose worst-case
scenario analyses concerning particular financial statements.
Part III offers an innovative alternative to the existing auditing
industry that would generate the foregoing benefits and eliminate the
moral hazard affecting auditors who may believe that their firms are
too big to fail. It first explains the drawbacks of existing liability and
self-insurance practices prevalent in the contemporary auditing
industry and then contrasts these with the structural advantages of
financial statement insurance. This creates benefits that would
significantly improve the audit function and offer a credible
1

See Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big-Four Auditors, 106 Colum. L. Rev.
_, [8--9] (2006).
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alternative to the existing auditing industry structure. Ironically, the
threat of such a credible alternative might just help save the auditing
industry from itself by increasing auditors’ effectiveness and thus
reducing the risk of exit-induced industry unraveling.
I. Risk
This Part explores the risk that one of the large audit firms will
fail in the near future, considering both the probability and the
magnitude of such an event. Part I.A explains how such firms face
substantial liability risks and introduces methods to measure and
interpret them. Part I.B presents and evaluates Professor Talley’s
model of the probability of near-term audit firm exit, concluding that
the model is a valuable contribution yet subject to important
limitations. Part I.C addresses the magnitude of the risk to
demonstrate how a single large audit firm’s failure could unravel the
entire auditing industry, compelling immediate policy attention to the
state of current auditing practice.
A. Exit and Unraveling
Four firms audit nearly all large public companies. A halfdozen much smaller (but still medium-sized) ones audit the
remainder. 2 This is down from eight large firms two decades ago,
when several firms in the next tier also represented viable
competitors to the large firms. The transformation resulted from the
dissolution of two firms---in 1991 the viable competitor, Laventhol
& Horwath, and in 2002 the large firm, Arthur Andersen---and from
mergers among all other large firms.3 In 2005, a criminal
investigation for peddling illegal tax shelters threatened to provoke
2

See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO-03-864, Public Accounting Firms: Mandated
Study on Consolidation and Competition 16, 20--22 (2003), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03864.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation] (finding that four largest firms audit 99% of
public company sales taken as an aggregate; 97% of public companies with sales exceeding $250
million; and 78% of all public companies).
3

Mergers were: (1) in 1987, Peat Marwick Mitchell with KMG into today’s KPMG; (2) in
1989, Ernst & Whinney with Arthur Young into today’s Ernst & Young; (3) also in 1989,
Deloitte Haskins & Sells with Touche Ross into today’s Deloitte & Touche; and (4) in 1998,
Price Waterhouse with Coopers & Lybrand into today’s PricewaterhouseCoopers. Id. at 10--11.
7

the dissolution of KPMG, one of the remaining four large firms.4
This was averted by the prosecution’s decision to pursue individual
accountants rather than the firm.
Although no large audit firm has exited the industry solely
because of federal securities fraud class actions, and most exits have
resulted from mergers, such liability risks have always been
considerable and appear to be increasing. Laventhol & Horwath’s
exit was due, in large part, to a series of money damages in class
actions concerning the savings-and-loan industry debacle and a tax
shelter scheme. 5 The impact of these damages was compounded by
the firm’s resulting inability to attract new work or obtain new clients
and by the adverse effects on its existing clients’ stock prices.6
Arthur Andersen exited due to a criminal prosecution arising
from the firm’s violating a consent decree and ensuing criminal
obstruction of justice charges for witness tampering during
investigations into the fraud-plagued Enron Corporation. 7 But largescale civil liabilities also loomed, including possible federal
securities fraud class actions. During the scandal, client flight also
afflicted Arthur Andersen and can be expected to accompany any
4

See United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32--34 (D.D.C. 2004) (detailing facts at
preliminary stage of Internal Revenue Service and Department of Justice investigations into
widespread criminal conduct at KPMG).
5

See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 301, 318--19 n.51 (2004) [hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeeper
Failure] (describing causes of Laventhol & Horvath’s bankruptcy); Morris W. Macey & Frank R.
Kennedy, Partnership Bankruptcy and Reorganization: Proposals for Reform, 50 Bus. Law. 879,
885 (1995) (describing how $73 million judgment entered against Laventhol & Horvath helped
push firm into bankruptcy); Charles W. Wootton & Stanley D. Tonge, Where Do Clients Go
When an Accounting Firm Goes Bankrupt?: The Case of Laventhol & Horwath, 29 Abacus 149,
151--52 (1993) (recounting wave of lawsuits that brought down Laventhol & Horvath).
6

See William R. Baber et al., Client Security Price Reactions to the Laventhol and Horwath
Bankruptcy, 33 J. Acct. Res. 385, 388--90 (1995) (finding statistically significant price declines
in stock of Laventhol & Horwath clients during period surrounding its bankruptcy
announcement); Macey & Kennedy, supra note 5, at 886 (observing that “as litigation problems
continued to increase and negative publicity developed in the press, new work and new clients
became practically unobtainable”).
7

See Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 917, 919--21 (2003)
(relating chain of events that led Department of Justice to indict Arthur Andersen).
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similar contamination that other large audit firms confront in the
future. 8
Auditors thus face a steady flow of liability risks, some of
which present staggering consequences, including the possibility of
industry exit. Numerous methods for conceptualizing or measuring
these risks exist; all approaches appreciate how risk is a combination
of probability and magnitude (likelihood and severity). An analysis
may explore the likelihood of a victory or defeat in various litigation
settings or of a given judgment or total judgments in a given time
period. Or an analysis could assess the magnitude of such results, at
the firm or industry level, on operations, insurability, or even
solvency.
Determining total risk involves applying some
combination rule that relates the probability and the magnitude
assessed. These tools have different utilities depending on the
question of interest.
Consider risk as measured by average settlements of lawsuits
against auditors, the number of which have steadily increased in
recent years.9 These can be important metrics for an audit firm’s
management plans and for policy analysis of the auditing industry. 10
They are particularly useful when audit firms buy third-party liability
insurance to address such risks.11 Averages are useful because the
essence of most liability insurance is pooling and then diversifying
risks, measured using means and standard deviations. This enables
insurers to make statistically valid predictions about the relationship
between premium and investment income on the one hand and loss
payouts and expenses on the other.

8

See Paul K. Chaney & Kirk L. Philpich, Shredded Reputation: The Cost of Audit Failure, 40 J.
Acct. Res. 1221 passim (2002) (investigating impact of Enron audit failure on stock market
valuation assigned to Arthur Andersen’s other clients).
9

See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 5, at 320 n.56 (citing PricewaterhouseCoopers,
LLP, 2002 Securit ies Litigation Study 7 (2003)).
10

See Talley, supra note 1, at 6 n.6.
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Id. at 3.
9

However, as the number of large audit firms has shrunk, an
increasingly important question concerns the probability and
magnitude of a cataclysmic liability payout. This is important
because, with only four large firms, catastrophic losses incurred by
even one of them pose significant systemic consequences. If only
three firms are available to serve thousands of global enterprises,
many enterprises will lack sufficient choice to obtain required
auditing services. As a matter of antitrust policy, the resulting
industry concentration would be intolerable. The industry as
currently structured could easily unravel. Governmental intervention
would be tempting. 12 What is the probability and magnitude of such
failure?
Casualty and liability insurers address such questions by
conceiving of right-tail risk (RTR)---payouts that appear along the
right tail of statistical probability distribution curves. This tool
addresses low-frequency, large-loss events that arise from such
natural catastrophic phenomena as earthquakes and floods and manmade events like terrorism and financial calamity. A common
quantitative tool, called the expected policyholder deficit, measures
catastrophic risk as the expected difference between (a) the present
value of claims paid plus costs and (b) the present value of premiums
collected plus investment income. 13 Insurers employ varying
actuarial measures and methodologies in assessing right-tail risk,
including the expected policyholder deficit as well as standard
12

See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 5, at 345 (“The ironic truth is that the four global
accounting firms that remain today have become ‘too big to fail.’”); John M. Holcomb,
Corporate Governance: Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Related Legal Issues, and Global Comparisons, 32
Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 175, 203 (2004) (“[T]he major accounting firms may be politically
insulated from further criminal prosecution and, in a sense, may have become too big to fail.”);
The Future of Auditing: Called to Account, Economist, Nov. 20, 2004, at 71--72 (quoting
Dartmouth College, Tuck Business School, Dean Paul Danos that “these firms are too important
to fail---but there are mechanisms by which they could fail” and Duke University Law School
Professor James Cox that “[t]he reality is that the Big Four is very likely too big to fail.
Regulators know this ---and that is a huge moral hazard.”).
13

See, e.g., Michael M. Barth, A Comparison of Risk-Based Capital Standards Under the
Expected Policyholder Deficit and the Probability of Ruin Approaches, 67 J. Risk & Ins. 397,
397--98, 400--04 (2000) (expla ining expected policyholder deficit approach and critiquing it in
context of its growing embrace by insurance agencies and regulators); Richard A. Ippolito,
Bankruptcy and Workers: Risks, Compensation and Pension Contracts, 82 Wash. U. L.Q. 1251,
1281--82 (2004) (explaining and using this tool to illustrate and analyze status of Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation).
10

deviation, the Gini mean, and innovative tools known as right-tail
deviation and right-tail index. 14
Stoked by the amplified magnitude of events like terrorist
attacks and phenomena like financial concentration, the academic
literature on risk increasingly applies formal models to assess
probabilities and magnitudes that take account of catastrophic risk. 15
Strictly in terms of the dollar amounts of auditor liability, the 2000s
have brought the largest legal payouts against auditors in history,
with several exceeding $100 million. 16 While scholars may disagree
on which is more important, the average or the catastrophic case,17
for contemporary auditing, “the risk of catastrophic loss, not the
increase in average settlement value, is the factor most likely to
cause the market for [auditing] services to unravel.”18
As a matter of intuition, therefore, one may hypothesize that
the risk of such a judgment inducing a firm to exit---with resulting
14

See J. David Cummins, Allocation of Capital in the Insurance Industry, 3 Risk Mgmt. & Ins.
Rev. 7, 9, 11--26 (2000) (discussing capital-allocation techniques, including expected
policyholder deficit approach, that have been suggested or employed in insurance industry to
calculate required capital amounts and pointing out that “long-tail liability policies are likely to
lead to different investment objectives than funds raised by issuing short-tail property insurance
policies”); Shawn Wang, An Actuarial Index of the Right-Tail Risk, 2 N. Am. Actuarial J. 88
(1998).
15

See, e.g., Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93
Geo. L.J. 783 passim (2005) (assessing feasibility of terrorism insurance with reference to
traditional catastrophic risks such as natural disasters); Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post9/11 Economy: The Convergence of Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37
Ariz. St. L.J. 435, 464--78 (2005) (assessing applicability of traditional insurability criteria to
catastrophic terrorism); see also The Financing of Catastrophic Risk (Kenneth A. Froot ed.,
1999) (compiling several articles on catastrophic risk).
16

See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 5, at 342 (detailing four settlements through 2004
exceeding $100 million: settlements of $110 million, $125 million, $217 million, and $335
million); Talley, supra note 1, at 67 n.105 (noting Fortress Re settlement in 2005 of $250
million).
17

Compare W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in
Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 Geo. L.J. 285, 285 (1998) (emphasizing juror awards of
punitive damages in rare cases when these reach such large sums as to “pose a catastrophic threat
of corporate insolvency”), with Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages:
An Empirical Study, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 743, 745 (2002) (emphasizing that jury awards of
punitive damages are rare and in most cases they “relate strongly to compensatory awards”).
18

Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 5, at 342.
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industry shrinkage so acute as to threaten industry unraveling---is
high in likelihood and severity. This may be so despite various legal
reforms of the mid-1990s tending to reduce such risk, given how
reforms of the early-2000s install new ones. Thus, for example,
while the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)
shifted to proportionate from joint liability for auditors,19 the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes new demands on auditors that increase
liability risk, including through new audits of internal control over
financial reporting. 20 How, then, might one measure the likelihood
of such an exit-inducing liability imposition against one of the four
large audit firms?
B. Probability
Professor Talley develops a probability model of near-term
audit firm exit based on a measure of right-tail liability risk from
federal securities fraud class actions (the “Audit Industry RTR
Model”). 21 The following summarizes the Model and then provides
three critiques.
1. Audit Industry Right-Tail Risk --- The Audit Industry RTR
Model assesses the likelihood that at least one of the four large audit
firms will fail shortly because of liability resulting from federal
securities fraud class actions. Professor Talley conceptualizes RTR
by relating alternative audit firm viability thresholds to the risk of
liability exposure above them over the next one to five years. This
19

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000) (adopting
heightened pleading standards, staying discovery pending motions to dismiss, and shifting to
proportional from joint-and-several liability); see also Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb(f) (2000)) (effectively banning related legal actions from
state and federal court adjudication).
20

See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (Supp. 2002); see also Management’s
Reports on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in
Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8238, 34-47,986, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,068, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R.
pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, 274) (noting discussions and comments affecting
implementation of various sections of Sarbanes -Oxley Act, including concerning internal control
reports); infra text accompanying notes 161--166.
21

Talley, supra note 1, at 71--72. Professor Talley mostly leaves the question of magnitude for
further inquiry while offering some useful notes on the issue. See id. at 104; infra Part I.C.
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requires, in turn, estimating both a plausible viability threshold and a
probability distribution of exposure.
To approximate viability thresholds, the Audit Industry RTR
Model employs assumptions for a “pivotal partner” in a large firm
deciding whether to exit or continue. 22 Assumptions contributing to
higher viability thresholds are, on a per pivotal partner basis:
revenue, closing costs, and perishable employee benefits. Those
tending to contribute to lower viability thresholds are the pivotal
partner’s years to retirement, cash flow from his or her next best
option, the search periods required to obtain alternative employment,
and that partner’s share of damages, fines, or costs.23 While these
assumptions capture important factors, others may be relevant but
not susceptible to scientific verification or even roughly reliable
estimation. For example, litigation costs in federal securities fraud
class actions are difficult to determine and vary considerably across
cases.
So devised and limited, the Audit Industry RTR Model
estimates viability thresholds of $454 million to $2.15 billion. 24
Although in line with anecdotal estimates, Professor Talley expressly
recognizes these figures as “very speculative and open to
considerable debate.”25 Invoking also the settlement level of a
contemporaneous non-class action, for purposes of the Model,

22

The Audit Industry RTR Model uses the concept of a pivotal partner as the median among
other partners of a large firm, half of whom may prefer dissolution earlier, and the others later,
than the pivotal partner. The pivotal partner’s analysis is thus the tipping point of a firm-wide
decision to dissolve or continue. See Talley, supra note 1, at 74.
23

Revenues are estimated as $312 million to $2 billion; the next best alternative is deemed the
same as that given up; required search periods are assumed to be one year (a hunch based on the
smoothness of relocating Arthur Andersen partners); years to retirement is guessed at 15; the
time discount factor is taken to be about 9% (extrapolated from the audit industry’s internal rate
of return); and rough guesses are made of the other items: perishable employee benefits of $10
million; 2% partner participation rate in firm profits; and $5 to $10 million in closing costs. Id.
at 77--79.
24

Id. at 79--80. This is a large range but it is difficult to develop a prudential model with a
narrower one.
25

Id. at 80.
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Professor Talley sets the low end of the viability threshold at $250
million. 26
To estimate the distribution of exposure, Professor Talley uses
historical data on lawsuit filings and settlements.27 He adjusts these
data for inflation although, to increase the Model’s statistical power,
not so much for legal changes.28 Lawsuit data are drawn from
multiple sources and are arrayed against data on market volatility as
a recognized predictor of filing levels. 29 The submodel of market
volatility as a predictor of lawsuit filings is a function of various
market factors.30 The Audit Industry RTR Model appears to do well
at explaining the historical pattern of liability. 31 Professor Talley
uses the resulting coefficient estimates to make out-of-sample
predictions about the future distribution of exposure. 32
A total of 132 cases in the sample of federal securities fraud
class actions name auditors as defendants.33 Case outcomes were
26

See id. at 80 (settlement concerning audit of Fortress Re).

27

Id. at 81--83.

28

Professor Talley addresses some legal change by creating certain statistical lags and time
trends. See id. at 81.
29

Id. at 83--85. Data on lawsuit filings include the SCAA data set dating to 1992 (containing
3600 cases, ninety percent of which are class actions), augmented by separate data from 1960-1995. Market volatility data are obtained from CRSP. Professor Talley states that it is well
known that lawsuit filings correlate with market volatility (measured by standard deviation of the
average monthly return during a year of the value weighted CRSP portfolio); he maps the 1991-2003 volatility data onto lawsuits to show that volatility is a good predictor of lawsuit filing
levels. Id. at 81--85.
30

Id. at 85. The model is based on the number of public firms, volatility, market capitalization,
industry composition, and time trends. Id. at 84.
31

Id. at 87.

32

Id. at 91.

33

This is fewer than ten percent of all actions. Id. at 86. The percentage has decreased
considerably since the Supreme Court announced that federal securities laws do not authorize
private securities fraud actions against those aiding and abetting securities fraud. See Cent. Bank
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) (“We reach the
uncontroversial conclusion . . . that the text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid
and abet a § 10(b) violation.”). In Professor Talley’s summary data, 6.55% of cases did so (132
of 2,016 cases), although the summary data did not always expressly identify all defendants; a
hand sample adjustment of the undercount led Professor Talley to increase the estimate to 8.41%.
14

determinable in seventy-nine of the 132 cases, with six of these
dismissed altogether and seven dismissing the audit firm. The
resulting liability distribution, approximated by the size of related
settlement funds, showed a significant right-tail skew with the
empirical data fitting well to a log-normal distribution. 34 Finally,
projecting the proportion of lawsuits to particular firms, Professor
Talley assigns one quarter apiece to each of the four large firms,
noting that one could use other apportionments, such as market share
or interpolations of the historical liability experience of each firm. 35
Supposing that one could accurately predict the number of
future lawsuits, what is the right-tail risk? Professor Talley offers a
synthesis and findings of the Audit Industry RTR Model. The
projections array assumed numbers of cases filed (ranging from five
to fifty)36 across (x), a horizontal axis depicting viability thresholds
(from $250 million to $2 billion), and (y), a resulting vertical axis
showing right-tail risk (from 0% to 100%). To illustrate, a $500
million viability threshold and five lawsuits yields a RTR of 2.2%;
with twenty lawsuits, the RTR is 23.2%. This increasing RTR
suggests a “lawsuit lottery”---the more lawsuits, the greater the
likelihood that one of the four large audit firms soon will seek to exit
as a result of federal securities fraud class actions.37
Projecting numbers of lawsuits according to varying market
volatility and using two different time horizons (one year and five
Talley, supra note 1, at 86.
34

Talley, supra note 1, at 88--89. That is, the natural log of the settlement amount was normally
distributed, with a mean of approximately $13 million and a standard deviation of 1.81.
35

Talley, supra note 1, at 35--36. Extrapolating from historical data, and assuming a reallocation
of lawsuits previously filed against Arthur Andersen, resulting distributions were 21% to PWC
and 26% to each of the other three; using market share (by registrants or asset values) rendered a
distribution of 18%, 26%, 27% and 29%. See infra text accompanying notes 50--52.
36

Arraying the data across the range of lawsuits from five to fifty offers a substantially
comprehensive picture when one considers that the sample set shows only 132 federal securities
fraud class action cases naming auditors (roughly thirteen per year distributed across five to eight
audit firms).
37

See generally Jeffrey O’Connell, The Lawsuit Lottery 8 (1979) (“Most crucial criteria for
payment [to tort plaintiffs] are largely controlled by chance . . . .”).
15

years), Professor Talley draws the following conclusions. Within
one year, nearly all viability threshold and market volatility
combinations give RTRs of less than twenty percent (with exceptions
at the lowest viability threshold and above average volatility) and
with none exceeding fifty percent. But for a five year horizon, RTRs
are dramatically higher across the board and close in on 100% at
combinations of low viability thresholds and high market volatility
levels.
These findings suggest a looming crisis---at least in terms of
the probability of a large audit firm’s exit (that is, setting aside the
magnitude of such an exit). The following discussion evaluates the
main strengths and weaknesses of the Audit Industry RTR Model for
assessing this suggestion.
3. Three Critiques. --- The Audit Industry RTR Model is
statistically and conceptually ambitious, although Professor Talley
emphasizes the Model’s assumptions, judgments, and scope to warn
against employing it exclusively as the basis for any policy
prescriptions.38 Rather, the Model should be used to provide an
additional piece of information that may be useful in studying policy
matters, when conjoined with all other available evidence. 39 Despite
the prudence of this cautionary modesty, the Model is a valuable
contribution and sheds specific new light on a widely recognized but
underutilized set of insights. The three critiques of the Audit
Industry RTR Model that follow, along with further analysis, open
into broader policy prescriptions that are explored afterwards.
a. First, in any statistical model of risk, numerous factors can
result in assessments that vary widely. The Audit Industry RTR
Model illustrates this, given the numerous assumptions it makes
when estimating viability thresholds and exposure distributions.
Others reasonably could reach different decisions on the various
judgments concerning matters such as data reliability, the attributes
of participants whose decisions are modeled, the interpretation of
38

Talley, supra note 1, at 7--9.

39

Id. at 6--9.
16

ambiguous evidence, and factors that are based entirely on opinion.
In the Audit Industry RTR Model, for example, pivotal partners are
highly abstract and make decisions according to delineated factors
such as revenue, costs, employee benefits, years to retirement, cash
flow from next-best options, required search periods, and shares of
damages.40
Analysts must make judgments when extrapolating from
known risks (the historical data) to unknown risks (the future
behaving differently according to different environments). While
historical data fit well when tested with the Audit Industry RTR
Model, Professor Talley’s deployment of the data to make out-ofsample predictions could make a purist statistician quiver. After all,
among other dynamics, the auditing industry’s regulatory structure
has changed since 2002, making data from previous periods
potentially incomparable with future periods.
Induced by scandals, auditors face new duties, independence
standards, and oversight structures. New duties include performing
audits of internal control over financial reporting and providing
related reports.41 New independence standards, first established by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and rendered into
law by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, restrict auditors from rendering for
audit clients an extensive catalogue of non-audit services.42 New
oversight structures include: reposing supervisory authority over
auditors in board audit committees rather than in management and
creating the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)

40

Id. at 72.

41

Professor Talley notes this change in canvassing potential sources of auditor liability but
explains how it cannot be modeled because there are simply no data as to related enforcement.
Id. at 16.
42

Under Sarbanes-Oxley, as under SEC rules adopted a few years earlier, auditors may not
perform any of the following services for audit clients: bookkeeping; financial information
systems; appraisal, valuation, or fairness opinions; actuarial; internal audit; management
functions; human resources; broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking; legal
and expert services unrelated to the audit. Sarbanes -Oxley Act of 2002 § 201(a), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j-1(g) (Supp. 2002); see also 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(1) (2005) (listing services that, if
performed, render accountant no longer independent).
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to regulate audit firms in ways that industry associations did before
2002. 43
Despite environmental changes and overblown rhetoric about
them, much about the auditing industry is unchanged compared to
periods from which the Model’s sampled cases are taken. 44 For
example, apart from some important legal refinements---such as
PSLRA’s shift to proportionate rather than joint liability for
auditors 45---sources of auditor liability based on performance still
hinge on standards that the industry---and now PCAOB---establish. 46
A stubborn continuity is how auditors are compensated by the
enterprises whose financial statements they audit and opine upon---a
dependency contributing severe structural infirmities to financial
reporting. 47 Thus, while the future always potentially differs from
the past, less has changed in auditing industry regulation than meets
many eyes.48
43

See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (Supp. 2002). Among PCAOB’s first
orders of business was adopting as governing auditing standards all those standards then in effect
as established by its industry-dominated predecessors. See Prof. Standards, Rules 3200T,
3300T, 3400T, 3500T, 3600T (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2006) (interim standards
effective Apr. 25, 2003); Order Regarding Section 103(a)(3)(B) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, Securities Act Release No. 8222, Exchange Act Release No. 47745, 80 SEC Docket 142
(Apr. 25, 2003).
44

See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform
(And It Might Just Work), 35 Conn. L. Rev. 915, 979, 987--88 (2003) [hereinafter Cunningham,
The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn].
45

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000).

46

Supra note 43; see, e.g., Monroe v. Hughes, 31 F.3d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that
while “good faith compliance with [GAAP] and [GAAS] discharges the accountant’s
professional obligation to act with reasonable care” courts may also consult general accounting
industry standards to determine adequate reporting obligations); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec.
Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1417, 1426 (9th Cir. 1994) (relying on adherence to GAAP and toy industry
standards to refute accusation of bad faith accounting practices); Adams v. Standard Knitting
Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 432--33 (6th Cir. 1980) (same); In re SmarTalk TeleServices, Inc. Sec.
Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 505, 514--15 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (holding that errors in GAAP that are later
revealed may demonstrate negligence but “highly suspicious facts” must be shown to
demonstrate reckless and deliberate violation of securities laws).
47

See infra text accompanying notes 207--208.

48

As to other changing features, such as in the legal environment, Professor Talley wrestles with
these using a variety of time trends and other devices. See Talley, supra note 1, at 35; supra note
27 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the Audit Industry RTR Model conceptually
replicates similar tools commonly used in casualty and liability
insurance markets to grapple with the relation between known data
and the unknown future. The Model relates, at a macro level, a
pivotal audit firm partner’s calculus comparing costs of continuing
with costs of exit. As such, it is an impressive adaptation of
conventional right-tail risk models. It usefully estimates probabilities
of cataclysmic liability judgments from federal securities fraud class
actions that could provoke audit firm exit.
The data could be harnessed to illuminate the specific risk of
particular firms teetering toward exit. The Audit Industry RTR
Model allocates a proportion of lawsuits to particular firms.
Professor Talley notes as possibilities: market share, interpolation
from historical experience, or equal distributions, and chooses the
lattermost.49 An unmentioned alternative would account for how
audit firms tend to specialize in certain industries.50 Some industries
use accounting policies for which risk of audit failure and firm
liability likely differ from others.51 This would skew liability risks
among firms, meaning different right-tail risks for each of the four
large firms.52 An Audit Firm RTR Model would be a useful adjunct49

Talley, supra note 1, at 35--36; supra note 35.

50

GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 27--30, app. IV at 110--15
(noting that in numerous industries, two firms audit more than seventy percent of assets,
highlighting petroleum and coal, communications, primary metals, and fabricated metals); see
also infra text accompanying notes 97--100.
51

Accounting irregularities can appear in any industry or enterprise, notably concerning
pervasive issues such as revenue and expense recognition. See Securities and Exchange
Commission, Study Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Problems can be
especially difficult for businesses experiencing particularly rapid growth or change or those in
new and rapidly changing industries. Of late, this means those sectors that increasingly rely
upon intangible rather than tangible assets. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Measuring and
Reporting the Knowledge Economy: Accounting for Economic Reality Under the Intangibles
Paradigm, 54 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 7--10 (2006).
52

This differs from historical interpolation, which projects firm-specific risk according to the
historical loss distribution, without regard to the distribution of engagements or firm
specialization. An approach would classify the 132 cases in the sample by industry and relate
these to individual firm industry concentration data. Such a model might be dubbed the Audit
Firm RTR Model. Part II.C.2 contemplates a further refinement called the Audit Client RTR
Model.
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--although admittedly subject to similar limitations as the Audit
Industry RTR Model.
b. A second critique of the Audit Industry RTR Model
concerns its scope of exit-risk sources. The Model uses frequency
data on one source of auditor liability risk, federal securities fraud
class actions. This is a practical necessity given available data, but
numerous other factors contribute to audit firm exit risk. 53
Recall, for example, how a confluence of forces, including
client disaffection, contributed to the demise of both Laventhol &
Horwath and Arthur Andersen. 54 The proximate cause of Arthur
Andersen’s exit was a criminal prosecution precipitated, in turn, by
its violation of a consent decree in a previous SEC enforcement
action. 55 In 2005, KPMG narrowly averted a similar plight from its
criminal conduct in peddling illegal tax shelters.56 Also, as noted,
mergers have been the major source of audit firm exit in the past two
decades.57 Professor Talley speculates, on the other hand, that the
Department of Justice would not likely allow exit by merger of any
of the remaining large audit firms.58
Even so, completing the Audit Industry RTR Model requires
incorporating proxies for all such other sources of exit risk. This
presents a formidable hurdle, given limited data on such forces. How
would one measure the prospects of forthcoming criminal
indictments, for example? But this limitation makes the Model’s
probability estimates conservative. When liability looms from one
53

Professor Talley provides a primer on sources of litigation risk. This includes a table and
summary of the legal landscape. Talley, supra note 1, at 27. The selection of federal securities
fraud class actions has appeal as providing the most comprehensive context for inquiring into
national policy implications and is an important piece of the overall public policy analysis. Id.
54

See supra text accompanying notes 3--9.

55

See United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 289--91 (5th Cir. 2004), rev’d on
other grounds, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005).
56

See United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30, 31--32 (D.D.C. 2004).

57

See supra text accompanying note 3.

58

Talley, supra note 1, at 44--45.
20

source, associated liabilities often arise from others.59 As noted,
sources of auditor liability hinge on generally accepted auditing
standards (GAAS).60 GAAS departures violate laws enforced in
federal securities fraud class actions and in many other contexts,
including criminal and SEC actions. So while Professor Talley’s
data do not capture all the components of potential cataclysm facing
the auditing industry, adding the others would increase the
probability of audit firm exit risk.
c. The third critique of the Audit Industry RTR Model is of
greatest policy significance. Professor Talley explains that the
“strategy of [his] study is to conceptualize liability risk solely as
exogenous, attempting to [assess] whether observed exposure events
characterize the types of risk that theory would predict to be
uninsurable.”61 In effect, this is a pure frequency model in that it
does not allow for Bayseian updating of participant beliefs (that is, as
auditors acquire more information, their behavior likely changes and
this would alter the risk assessment calculus). Some contrast this
latter, updating method with the pure frequency method by
denominating the probability assessment exercises as subjectivist and
objectivist, respectively. 62 Each has its limits.
The exogenous factors conceptualization essentially assumes
that some litigation risk exists beyond auditors’ control. The
decision to take this approach is influenced, in part, by an unresolved
debate in the academic literature concerning how much the merits of
a lawsuit matter in assessing liability risk. Scholars debate the ability
of firms to avoid litigation. 63 Debate turns further on whether
59

Professor Talley notes how sources of liability risk “overlap,” “traverse,” and interact in
complex ways, so that a “comprehensive analysis of cataclysmic liability risk borne by auditors”
would need to incorporate all related variables, but this is simply not possible given available
data. Id.
60

See supra notes 44, 47, and accompanying text.

61

Talley, supra note 1, at 5. Part III, infra, inquires into the implications for insurance theory
and practice.
62

See Ann Bostrom, Risk Perceptions: “Experts” vs. “Lay People”, 8 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F.
101, 104 n.15 (1997).
63

See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities
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various legal reforms alter related liability exposure.64 Amid the
academic stalemate, auditors may face risks endogenous to their own
actions (that is, within their control), important for any belief in law’s
deterrent effect; but with the sizable risk of frivolous litigation,
auditors cannot effectively change their relevant behavior except by
exit. 65
Apart from this theoretical defense of the exogenous frequency
approach, attempting to incorporate variables such as audit quality
would inject too much noise into the Audit Industry RTR Model. 66
This valid point says more about the limits of statistical modeling
generally than about this Model in particular.
And this
conceptualization also renders the Model a conservative estimation
in the sense of capturing worst case scenarios that, while not
necessarily likely, are cognizable. As well, it would be surprising if
cases tripping the Model’s viability threshold---ranging from several
hundred million dollars to more than one billion dollars---were
entirely without legal merit.
Moreover, it is one thing to stipulate that the merits might not
matter when estimating liability exposure and establishing a model; it
is another to believe that auditors cannot influence the quality of their
Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497, 524 (1991) (arguing that structural characteristics of legal
system preclude merits being included in settlement calculus); Joel Seligman, The Merits Do
Matter, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 438 (1994); David L. Gilbertson & Steven D. Avila, The Plaintiffs’
Decision to Sue Auditors in Securities Litigation: Private Enforcement or Opportunism?, 24 J.
Corp. L. 681, 707 (1999) (finding three opportunism variables to be significantly associated with
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ decisions to name auditors as codefendants in securities class action
lawsuits).
64

See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of Institutional Investors
as Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 106 Colum. L. Rev. __ (2006); Talley, supra
note 1, at 5 (comparing literature that reaches differing conclusions on this question and finding
PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provision does add some value for shareholders); Michael Perino, Did the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 913, 915 (finding PSLRA
did not result in decrease of class actions filed); Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and
Discovery Stays: An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on
’33 and ’34 Act Claims, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 537, 578--79 (1998) (arguing PSLRA’s pleading
standard, if strictly applied and interpreted, will be overinclusive and eliminate most private
securities-fraud lawsuits).
65

Talley, supra note 1, at 5.

66

See id. at 40.
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audits that, at least in some ways, contribute to related risks. So,
without making conjectures about how auditor behavior may bear on
the exact role of the merits in assessing liability risk, consider some
evidence of variability of audit quality that suggests auditor capacity
to influence risk. It speaks to how auditors can and do make
Bayesian updating adjustments, without regard to the academic
debate over how the merits matter in litigation.
Auditing is easiest and most effective when auditors enjoy a
reputation for conservatism and firmness that deters managers from
attempting to engage in accounting deception. As an auditor’s
reputation for toughness slackens, managerial willingness to pursue
accounting shenanigans and even fraud can increase. Considerable
evidence supports the view that the reputation of auditors changed
during the 1990s from one of scrupulous watchdog to conciliatory
lapdog.67
First, institutionally, audit firms expanded their services well
beyond the audit function. This practice embedded the large audit
firms in deeply incestuous relationships with their clients, impairing
their independence. 68 As examples, Ernst & Young developed a
business partnership with its client, PeopleSoft;69 some of KPMG’s
illegal tax shelters, for which it narrowly escaped criminal
indictment, were provided to clients and their audit committee
members;70 and both KPMG and PWC owned investments in their
67

See, e.g., AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 991 F. Supp. 234, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997),
rev’d, 206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000).
68

This may have been due, in part, to policies of the Federal Trade Commission that induced the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) to rescind a ban on advertising and
other methods of client solicitation. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 772 (1993) (discussing
AICPA report on its decision). This policy may have been improvident. To the extent that it
unleashed competition in a market in which the product’s external quality is essentially
unobservable, the competition can impair product quality. See George A. Akerlof, The Market
for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. Econ. 488, 488--89
(1970).
69

See In the Matter of Ernst & Young, Exchange Act Release No. 46,710 (Oct. 23, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/34-46710.htm (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
70

See United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2004); see also Sheldon D.
Pollack & Jay A. Soled, Tax Professionals Behaving Badly, 105 Tax Notes 201, 210 (2004).
23

audit clients.71 Auditors also impaired their independence by
performing for audit clients extensive non-audit services that
generated considerable revenue compared to audit revenue. 72
Impaired independence reduced auditors’ reputations as watchdogs,
which likely tempted many managers to indulge in accounting
aggressions. These infirmities prompted the SEC’s ban on auditors
performing most non-audit services for their clients, the ban later
adopted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 73
Second, auditor complicity during the 1990s manifested itself
in the growth of extensively catalogued accounting irregularities of
the period.
These included widespread premature revenue
recognition, pervasive use of “big bath” accounting, extensive
creation and exploitation of artificial reserves, and other deceptions.74
Auditors signed off on these aggressions, suggesting ability to
influence audit quality, financial statement reliability, and liability

71

See In the Matter of PricewaterhouseCoopers, Exchange Act Release No. 40,945 (Jan. 14,
1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-40945.txt (on file with the Columbia
Law Review); Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Censures KPMG for Auditor
Independence Violation (Jan. 14, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-4.txt (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
72

See William W. Bratton, Jr., Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 Tul. L. Rev.
1275, 1350 (2002) (stating that fees from audit clients for non-audit services rose from thirteen
percent of revenues in the 1970s to fifty percent of revenues in the 1990s); Jeffrey N. Gordon
What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some
Initial Reflections, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1233, 1237 (2002) (arguing that most important guarantor
of auditor independence is saliency of auditor terminations, a material event that must promptly
be disclosed, but the value of which drops dramatically when audit firms cross-sell consulting
services which give auditors incentives not to sever clients); Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability
of a Strong SEC, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 775, 786 (2006) (“[C]onsulting fees rose from seventeen
percent of audit fees in 1990 to sixty-seven percent in 1999 . . . .”) (citation omitted).
73

See supra note 41. In KPMG’s case, the infirmities also led to additional restrictions on its
practice. See United States v. Stein, No. 05 CR 00888(LAK)(ECF), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
42915 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2006). Despite these restrictions on non-audit services, firms are still
permitted to provide tax services to audit clients. See Matthew J. Barrett, “Tax Services” as a
Trojan Horse in the Auditor Independence Provisions of Sarbanes -Oxley, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev.
463.
74

See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The “Numbers Game,” Speech at the
NYU
Center
for
Law
and
Business
(Sept.
28,
1998),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
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exposure. Subsequent reforms attempt to seal many of these paths to
accounting fraud.75
Third, evidence of auditor ability to influence audit quality and
liability risk appears in dramatic changes in the number of financial
restatements, frequency of auditor switching, and percentage of
qualified opinions given. Restatements soared to a record high of
160 by 1999, 76 with all large audit firms inculpated.77 These do not
automatically signal auditor failure, as they can be due to evolving
interpretations of accounting standards or similar innocuous
circumstances.78 But they show varying auditor ability to influence
audit quality and therefore liability risk. 79
The fact that auditors increasingly began to sever clients after
the 1990s era of auditing laxity ended 80 suggests that the related
75

See, e.g., SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101, 17 C.F.R. pt. 211 (1999) (revenue
recognition); Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 146 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.
2002) (big bath accounting).
76

These averaged forty-nine annually from 1990--1997, jumped to ninety-one in 1998, and then
climbed to 150 and 156 in 1999 and 2000, respectively. See George B. Moriarty & Philip B.
Livingston, Quantitative Measures of the Quality of Financial Reporting, Fin. Executive,
July/Aug. 2001, at 53, 54. They have risen more dramatically since reforms created in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
77

See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Report on Financial Statement Restatements: Trends,
Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses and Remaining Challenges 4 (2002); Theodore
Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different? An Empirical Examination of
Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 263 (2004).
78

See William R. Kinney Jr., Zoe-Vonna Palmrose & Susan Scholz, Auditor Independence,
Non-Audit Services, and Restatements: Was the U.S. Government Right?, 42 J. Acct. Res. 561,
566 (2004).
79

See James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting: The PCAOB and the
Metrics for Accounting Measurements, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 301, 318 (2003) (“The [rise in]
restatements may well portend both a greater diligence on the part of the auditors as well as a
stiffening of their resolve.”); A. C. Pritchard, The Irrational Auditor and Irrational Liability, 10
Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 19, 27 (2006) (“The restatement itself is ambiguous: does it reflect poor
auditing in the past, or particularly diligent auditing today?”); see also Coffee, Gatekeeper
Failure, supra note 5, at 314--15 (attributing restatement levels of late 1990s to managerial
ambitions that showed broad willingness to assume greater risks---accompanied by auditor
solicitude).
80

See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 5, at 348 n.148. Professor Coffee explains that
In 2003, over 1460 public companies changed auditors, which was the highest
number in at least five years. Although such switches could be because the
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reforms led firms to sever high-risk clients.81 This also suggests that
auditors are capable of identifying them (and other evidence strongly
supports this conclusion too).82 Finally, the percentage of qualified
auditor reports increased significantly from 1999 to 2002, signaling
similar auditor ability to influence liability risk. 83 Assessments of
audit firm failure probability should take account of this auditor
ability to influence liability risk and the concomitant risk of firm exit.
*

*

*

To incorporate these three critiques of the Audit Industry RTR
Model, the dynamics of auditing practice and the legal and regulatory
environment pose difficulties for prognostications based upon data
spanning across the previous ten or fifteen years. Those are quite
different eras. Professor Talley grapples with these difficulties by
using various time trends and proxies. This is a credible attempt to
tame a model trained on the exogenous rather than the endogenous
but (a) the two are tightly interwoven and (b) the exogenous changes
over time.
Nevertheless, Professor Talley’s estimates are
conservative.
client was dissatisfied with the auditor, many were because the auditor
considered the client too risky---or because the auditor raised its fees in light of
that increased risk. . . . By itself, this evidence may not prove that auditors are
becoming significantly more selective with regard to clients, but it is at least
consistent with such a hypothesis.
Id.
81

See Jagan Krishman, Auditor Switching and Conservatism, 69 Acct. Rev. 200, 200 (1994)
(attributing auditor switching to auditor determinations to withhold unqualified opinions based
on conservative critiques of client reporting); Kannan Raghunandan & Dasaratha V. Rama,
Auditor Resignations and the Market for Audit Services, 18 Auditing: J. Prac. & Theory 124,
126 (1999) (showing it is rare for large firm to accept engagements by enterprises whose
previous auditor resigned).
82

See In re Deloitte & Touche LLP, SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No.
2237 (Apr. 26, 2005) (emphasizing that large audit firm knew its client, Adelphia
Communications Corp., was “high-risk”); infra notes 190--191 (noting Arthur Andersen’s
manifest awareness of how acutely risky its client, Waste Management, had been).
83

See Marleen Willekens, Auditor Reporting Conservatism as a Defense Mechanism Against
Increased Post-Enron Litigation Risk 10--11 (working paper on file with author) (probing for
increases in qualified reports by four large audit firms in post-Enron era and finding: 4.12% in
1999; 5.41% in 2000; 6.84% in 2001; and 6.85% in 2002).
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In assessing the Audit Industry RTR Model’s robustness and
sources of bias, Professor Talley recognizes how several factors may
produce downward bias to the estimates. Most significantly, these
include how the Model captures solely liability risk associated with
federal securities fraud class actions, not other exit inducements.84
Including these would increase cataclysmic probability and project
greater exit risk. 85 Conversely, several factors may produce upward
bias. Most significantly, the Model implicitly assumes a constant
rate of auditor complicity and no decisions to sever high-risk
clients.86 Changing these assumptions would have opposite effects if
auditors are diligent (and would exacerbate the ill effects if auditors
are lax).
In the end, these concessions do not diminish the importance
or value of attempting to quantify auditing industry right-tail risk.
The major open questions---the role of factors other than federal
securities fraud class actions and of auditor capacity to influence
ultimate risk---are about the causal force that can bring a risk to
realization. True, misconceptions about causality can lead to
misestimating probability, a core hazard dimension of risk
assessment. This can limit the ability to manage risk and prescribe
suitable policies to address it. If people believe that auditor exit risk
is solely a function of the number of lawsuits, market volatility, and
viability thresholds for example, a problem of causation is created or
overlooked.
C. Magnitude
Equally important is the other core hazard dimension of risk
assessment: magnitude. 87 If a large audit firm’s exit posed no
84

Talley, supra note 1, at 6--7.

85

Less dramatically, the Model ignores litigation costs which, if included, would likewise
increase cataclysmic probability and produce greater exit risk. See id. at 39.
86

Again less dramatically, the Model’s estimates may be higher than reality because (a) fees can
be increased or matched to offset risk and (b) plaintiffs may restrain themselves lest they kill the
goose that lays the golden egg. Id. at 40.
87

Professor Talley focuses on probabilities, although he offers some notes on magnitude to
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significant systemic consequences, even a 100% probability of that
occurring would not matter. But, as the following discusses, the
systemic consequences of current concentration in the audit industry
raise immediate policy concerns. The stakes amplify if, as the Audit
Industry RTR Model predicts, one soon were to face exit due to
cataclysmic liabilities.88 Setting aside the costs of bankruptcy
administration and employee dislocation---whose significance is
contestable as a matter of theory89---a critical component of the
magnitude of a large audit firm exiting the industry is its effect on
audit industry competition.
1. Market Concentration. --- The Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed
the General Accounting Office (GAO) to study the factors leading to
the four mergers of large audit firms that reduced their number from
eight to five (Arthur Andersen’s dissolution reduced it further to
four). 90 Factors the GAO identified included keeping pace with
client size, global reach, and technology, as well as exploiting
economies of scale. 91 Merging with peers was the way to achieve
these goals. The resulting oligopoly is tight. 92
Consider various measures of concentration using the
Herfendahl-Hirshman Index (HHI). 93 Indexes below 1000 signal an
justify a tentative conclusion that these are “at least plausibility significant.” Talley, supra note
1, at 43.
88

See supra Part I.B.1.

89

Talley, supra note 1, at 41. Professor Talley observes that classical finance theory denies
normative systemic significance to bankruptcy, which is simply a cash flow reallocation without
value effects, but notes how this overlooks critical points such as employee dislocation. Id.
90

See GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 2.

91

See id. at 12--15.

92

See id. at 20--22 (indicating that four largest firms audit 99% of public company sales taken as
aggregate, 97% of public companies with sales exceeding $250 million, and 78% of all public
companies).
93

HHI measures market concentration by summing the squares of each member firm’s size
measured in terms of market share. An illustrative short-hand formula determines HHI for n
equal-size firms as: n x (100 ÷ n) ÷ 2 = 10,000 ÷ n. So, with one firm, HHI = 10,000; with five
equal-sized firms, HHI = 2,000; with ten equal-sized firms, HHI = 1,000; and with 100 equalsized firms, HHI = 100. See Dep’t of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 15 (1997)
(explaining HHI).
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unconcentrated market while those above 1800 signal a highly
concentrated market. Measuring market share in terms of sales, HHI
was well below 1000 before the audit firm mergers began, it jumped
to just under 1800 following a 1989 merger, rose above 2000
following a 1998 merger, and climbed to 2500 upon Arthur
Andersen’s dissolution in 2002. 94 Measuring market share in terms
of numbers of clients, HHIs remain not much above 1000 for clients
with sales less than $100 million, but for clients with sales greater
than that, today’s HHI is well above 1800---indicating a highly
concentrated market for the vast majority of large public
enterprises.95
Despite increasing concentration, the GAO found no evidence
of impaired price competition in the market for auditing services.96 It
used a simulated pure-price competition model to conclude that
existing market concentration is not inconsistent with a pricecompetitive environment. 97 In fact, much of the U.S. economy is
concentrated yet, the GAO noted, remains price-competitive. On the
other hand, two points bear emphasizing. First, the GAO’s analysis
was conducted using data covering the period before Arthur
Andersen’s demise. Price competition may diminish with four rather
than five participants. Second, the lack of alternatives available to
clients is a more direct concern for the auditing industry. 98

94

GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 18--20.

95

Id.

96

Id. at 25.

97

Id.

98

In addition, competition based on audit quality, although more difficult to asses than
competition based on price, is important and concentration may reduce it. See Sean M.
O’Connor, Be Careful What you Wish For: How Accountants and Congress Created the
Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. Rev 741, 788 (2004) (arguing that it is “unlikely
that an efficient market for reputational intermediaries--necessary to induce them to maintain
their reputation through demonstrated integrity and objectivity--can exist in today’s highly
concentrated market dominated by the Big Four accounting firms”); Prentice, Inevitability of a
Strong SEC, supra note 72, at 786 (“Reputational constraints fail to restrain large accounting
firms, both because large firms have a huge competitive advantage over second-tier firms that is
difficult to squander and because as a group, large firms are lumped together such that one firm
does not profit much from behaving better than its competitors.”).
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A tight oligopoly in the large company auditing market
obviously limits service alternatives for large enterprises. On the
surface, with four audit firms, an enterprise engaging one for
auditing and another for non-auditing services has but two choices if
it were to fire either of those; with three audit firms, it would have
but one choice. 99 The reality is even worse than that.
The four large audit firms each boast special expertise in
certain industries and lack the requisite specialization in others: a
single audit firm often dominates the market for clients in certain
industries, and two firms command more than seventy percent of the
reporting in numerous others.100 Clients in those industries may have
nowhere else to go. Thus, if an enterprise using Firm A for auditing
and Firm B for consulting is in an industry where Firm A dominates
and Firm C lacks expertise, then under the prevailing structure the
choice may boil down to a single alternative or even none at all. 101
Nor can smaller audit firms fill the gap. They lack the
resources necessary to service the needs of many enterprises that
routinely engage the large firms.102 They face other formidable
barriers to entry as well. For example, the GAO simulated a merger
among the next five largest firms after the big four to see if a viable
competitor could emerge. 103 Those firms together commanded an
99

Talley, supra note 1, at 44--45.

100

See id. at 35--36; see also Allen T. Craswell, Jere R. Francis & Stephen L. Taylor, Auditor
Brand Name Reputations and Industry Specializations, 20 J. Acct. & Econ. 297 (1995); Chris E.
Hogan & Debra C. Jeter, Industry Specialization by Auditors, 18 Auditing: J. Prac. & Theory 1
(1999) (study of trends driving auditor concentration from 1976 to 1993); The Future of
Auditing: Called to Account, supra note 12, at * (citing Public Accounting Report newsletter
stating that, in 2004, three of the large firms audited 97.3% of oil and gas industry and that two
of them audited 88.2% of casino industry, with similar dominion in air transportation, coal, and
other industries).
101

See The Future of Auditing: Called to Account, supra note 12, at * (providing example of
Sun Microsystems, which uses three of the four big firms for non-audit services and fourth firm
for audit services, and noting that Sun’s size renders all smaller firms inadequate).
102

See GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 46--48 (concluding that
smaller firms generally lack resources to audit large public companies).
103

Id. app. 1 at 61--63. GAO’s simulation used the model developed in Rajib Doogar & Robert
F. Easley, Concentration Without Differentiation: A New Look at the Determinants of Audit
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8.6% market share in 2002. Under the best-case simulation scenario
(where the newly merged firm was maximally efficient measured by
the staff-to-partner ratio), the result was an 11.2% market share. 104
In effect, the four largest firms, as a group, lack any competitors.
Among other barriers to entry, smaller firms cite litigation risk
and difficulty obtaining insurance. 105 While this is a routine lament
in many U.S. industries,106 the concern bears some legitimacy across
sectors, and certainly for the auditing industry. The scandals
epitomized by Arthur Andersen’s failure and Enron’s house of cards
meant “insurance companies saw increased risk and uncertainty from
insuring firms that audited public companies.”107 Premiums
skyrocketed and coverage contracted.108 While acute for small audit
firms, the large four firms confront similar difficulties.109
However, it is not certain whether such concentration and
barriers to entry are entirely lamentable. Scholars disagree about the
Market Concentration, 25 J. Acct. & Econ. 235 (1998).
104

GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 50--51. Under moderate
efficiency assumptions, resulting shares ranged from 4.5% to 6.4% ---a reduction in total market
share! Id.
105

Id. at 49.
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See, e.g., Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places: The Value of Risk Choice, 42
Emory L.J. 1, 93--101 (1993) (discussing statutory provisions limiting potential liability for ski
area and rock climbing operators); Bryan A. Liang & LiLan Ren, Medical Liability Insurance
and Damage Caps: Getting Beyond Band Aids to Substantive Systems Treatment to Improve
Quality and Safety in Healthcare, 30 Am. J.L. & Med. 501, 514--17 (2004) (discussing effects of
high costs of medical malpractice insurance on physician practice); W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia
Born, Medical Malpractice Insurance in the Wake of Liability Reform, 24 J. Legal Stud. 463,
463--64 (1995) (describing negative trends in healthcare associated with rising medical
malpractice premiums).
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GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 49. The others were Global
Crossing Ltd.; Qwest Communications International Inc.; and WorldCom, Inc.
See
Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn, supra note 44, at 924--25. Professor Talley notes how,
due to such increased costs, most large audit firms currently rely upon self-insurance to address
liability exposure rather than use third-party liability insurance. Talley, supra note 1, at 2. Part
III, infra, inquires into insurance matters, including distinguishing between liability insurance
and other forms, such as financial statement insurance.
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GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 49.
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optimal number of audit firms for given markets. Some evidence
indicates that concentration produces specialization that reduces
financial misstatement risk. 110 Other research finds that having a
large number of audit firms reduces the risk of a dominant firm
establishing accounting policies that could spawn inferior financial
reporting. 111 However too many client alternatives can enable
clients, through opinion shopping, to pressure auditors into solicitude
that they should resist. 112
Debates that are similarly unresolved concern the benefits or
costs of having enterprises rotate their auditors. One tradeoff is
between developing client-specific expertise that liberates auditors
from reliance on managerial assertions versus developing a
complacent attitude that diminishes professional skepticism. 113
Another factor is the effect of audit firm rotation on the ability of
smaller firms to compete with the four large firms.114 In any event,
auditor rotation is a policy option only if a minimum number of
suitable firms exist or could enter into competitive positions.115
110

Joseph V. Carcello & Albert L. Nagy, Auditor Industry Specialization and Fraudulent
Financial Reporting, in Proceedings of the 2002 Deloitte & Touche/University of Kansas
Auditing Symposium [pin], [pin] (James Heintz ed., date).
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GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 36.
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Id.
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See Joseph V. Carcello & Albert L. Nagy, Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial
Reporting, 23 Auditing: J. Prac. & Theory 55 (2004) (finding no evidence that audit tenures
over eight years increases fraudulent reporting and that fraudulent financial reporting is more
likely in first three years of auditor-client relationship); Van E. Johnson, Inder K. Khurana & J.
Kenneth Reynolds, Audit-Firm Tenure and the Quality of Financial Reports, 19 Contemp. Acct.
Res. 637 (2002) (finding no evidence of inferior financial reports for enterprises with audit firm
tenures of nine or more years as compared to evidence of lower quality reports for enterprises
with tenures from two to eight years); Larry R. Davis, Billy Soo & Gregory M. Trompeter,
Auditor Tenure and the Ability to Meet or Beat Earnings Forecasts (treating long tenure as
fifteen or more years and finding reporting quality deterioration) (manuscript on file with
author).
114

See Benito Arrunada, Mandatory Rotation of Company Auditors: A Critical Examination, 17
Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 31, 41--44 (1997) (evaluating competitive implications of mandatory
rotation of auditors proposal); The Future of Auditing: Called to Account, supra note 12, at 71
(quoting Duke University Law School Professor James Cox as suggesting that mandatory audit
firm rotation could improve ability of smaller firms to compete with four large audit firms).
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See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO-04-216, Public Accounting Firms:
Required Study on the Potential Effects of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation 41--42 (2003).
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All such points of academic debate may be contestable, but
only within a range of audit firm numbers. When there are eight, or
five, or even four firms, debaters legitimately can contend that eight,
five, or four is the more or less ideal number. It strains credulity to
contend that three is optimal---or two or one. At that level, debate
dissolves and the question is whether three (or two or one) under the
current audit industry structure is merely tolerable or even
sustainable. In this view, the magnitude of a single additional audit
firm exiting the market is essentially overwhelming.
2. Governmental Response. --- So, wholly apart from the
Audit Industry RTR Model’s probability assessments, momentous
policy issues appear from considering the existing structure of the
auditing industry, amplified considerably by the prospect of further
diminution. Upon recognizing this risk, the GAO prescribed
developing policies that would prevent further industry
consolidation. 116 With Arthur Andersen’s dissolution evidently in
mind, it suggested balancing firm and individual responsibility,
holding people---not firms---liable for harms.117 Moreover, the GAO
emphasized, policymakers cannot allow the large audit firms to
believe that they are too big to fail. 118 However, preventing such a
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See GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 52.

117

Id. at 53. Imposing liability on individuals rather than on firms addresses how individuals
may have lesser reputation-based incentives, compared to firms, to detect and deter client error
or deception. See Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and
Enron, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 394, 408 (2004) (arguing that although it was irrational for Arthur
Andersen to become captured by Enron it may not have seemed irrational to individual partners
because Enron was their only client); Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in
Rules Governing Lawyers and Auditors, 29 Iowa J. Corp. L. 397, 411 (2004) (“[I]ndividual
partners in the firm may still be interested in getting and keeping a lucrative but risky client-even if it harms the firm as a whole . . . .”); Larry E. Ribstein, SarbOx: The Road to Nirvana,
2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 279, 288 [hereinafter Ribstein, SarbOx] (suggesting that while an audit
firm has “an interest in motivating its members to build the firm’s reputation, its members’
careers may depend on pleasing the client executives”). The Department of Justice followed this
advice in 2005 by opting to forego indicting KPMG and to pursue instead individual defendants.
Its strategy backfired when the pressure it applied to KPMG led it to violate the individual
defendants’ constitutional rights. United States v. Stein, No. 05 CR 00888(LAK)(ECF), 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42915 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2006).
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belief may be difficult, given conflicting history, policy analysis, and
how even a small number of individuals holding the belief could
trigger calamity.
As to conflicting guidance from history, governmental
flirtations with the too big to fail policy are intermittent.
Government willingly bought into the bailout business in the 1970s
and 1980s;119 then this habit dissipated in the early 1990s when
Congress restricted the policy for banks.120 Then again, the
government orchestrated a bailout of Long Term Capital
Management (LTCM) in 1998. 121 While the government refrained
from preserving Arthur Andersen in 2002, many market participants
and some policymakers later questioned the reticence. 122 Whether
related to that criticism or not, in 2005 the government refrained
119

An inchoate too big to fail policy emerged in the early 1970s when the federal government
provided financial assistance to prevent the failure of Penn Central Transportation Co. and other
railroads, as well as Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. See Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-70, 85 Stat. 178 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1841--1852 (2000)) (providing
assistance to Lockheed); William E. Thoms, Clear Track for Deregulation American Railroads,
1970--1980, 12 Transp. L.J. 183, 195--205 (1982) (describing railroad bankruptcies and
government action to maintain rail service). The policy assumed greater force in the late 1970s
with rescues of Chrysler Corporation and the City of New York. See Chrysler Corporation Loan
Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324, 1324--35 (1980) (expired Dec. 31,
1983); New York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-339, 92 Stat. 460
(repealed/expired/superseded [date]); New York City Seasonal Financing Act of 1975, Pub. L.
No. 94-143, 89 Stat. 797 (amended [?] [date]).
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The government’s formal too big to fail policy crystallized in banking regulation in the early
1980s, when the Federal Reserve arranged the bailout of Continental Illinois. See Arthur E.
Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Ris ks of Nationwide Banks, 77
Iowa L. Rev. 957, 994 (1992). This stance changed in the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvements Act of 1991, which established nonintervention as the basic rule. 12
U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)--(E) (2000) (requiring FDIC to resolve banking issues using least cost
resolution). An exception requires the existence of “systemic risk” from failure, a conclusion
that requires agreement of two-thirds of the boards of the FDIC and Federal Reserve plus the
concurrence of the Secretary of the Treasury (in consultation with the President). 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(c)(4)(G).
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See Kevin Dowd, Too Big to Fail? Long Term Capital Management and the Federal Reserve
(Cato Inst., Paper No. 52, 1999) (describing Federal Reserve leadership in bailout of Long Term
Capital Management and its impact).
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See, e.g., GAO, Study on Auditing Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 19 (“It is unclear
whether and to what extent the Antitrust Division was consulted and to what extent DOJ’s
Antitrust Division had input into the decision to criminally indict [Arthur] Andersen.”); The
Future of Auditing: Called to Account, supra note 12, at * (“Almost everyone agrees that
[Arthur] Andersen’s collapse made the financial system more vulnerable.”).
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from prosecuting a criminal indictment against KPMG although
there was no question about the firm’s guilt.
As to policy analysis, on one hand, externality justifications
for invoking the too big to fail doctrine may be inapplicable to
auditing. Such arguments made in the banking sector emphasize
preventing runs on banks and spillover effects that disrupt credit
flows.123 No such effects are likely in auditing. On the other hand,
an audit firm’s pending collapse likely would impair investor
confidence and provoke clients to flee. It is uncertain whether other
firms could absorb fleeing clients swiftly. Fear of a resulting stock
market meltdown (the chief justification for LTCM’s rescue) could
induce regulatory intervention. 124 After all, second-order effects of a
stock market meltdown include capital misallocation and panic that
could resemble, on a different scale, runs on banks.
True, such concerns also accompanied Arthur Andersen’s
pending demise, and yet the government allowed it to fail. But the
difference between four instead of five firms is less problematic than
the difference would be between three instead of four firms. Indeed,
even with four firms, the current auditing market for large enterprises
restricts client choices in possibly suboptimal ways. And there is
reason to suspect that the Department of Justice would not allow a
merger between any of the four large firms.125 So, on balance, it
would not be irrational for auditors to believe that the government
simply would not allow three rather than at least four firms to
dominate the industry. 126
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See Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An Economic Analysis,
77 Iowa L. Rev. 1083, 1105--06 (1992); Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 998--99.
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See Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 Tex.
L. Rev. 777, 868--72 (2000); Mark E. Van Der Weide & Satish M. Kini, Subordinated Debt: A
Capital Markets Approach to Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 195, 254 n. 196 (2000).
125

Talley, supra note 1, at 44--45.
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Cf. The Future of Auditing: Called to Account, supra note 12, at 71 (“[A] fear, shared by
many, is that should another Big Four firm collapse, there is a real risk that the government
would take over audits and that financial markets would suffer long-term harm.”).
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Moreover, such a belief can present moral hazard even if held
by as few as a critical mass of team members on a single audit
engagement. To paraphrase President George W. Bush’s response to
the emerging fiasco at Enron Corporation, it only takes a few bad
apples to spoil the whole cart. For support, individual team members
can point to the reversal of the criminal conviction against Arthur
Andersen and the dismissal of the criminal indictments against all
individual defendants in the KPMG case. Formal probabilities in the
Audit Industry RTR Model aside, highly plausible cataclysmic risk
scenarios are easy to imagine under the current industry structure.
Peril accompanies actual or potential government intervention
to prevent failure of an institution deemed too big to fail. For
auditing, moral hazard means greater risk taking than markets alone
would tolerate. 127 This could lead to the kind of laxity that
characterized much auditing behavior during the 1990s.128 Such
laxity can impair the reliability of financial reporting. It offsets, and
could even negate, any benefits of more effective auditing and
financial reporting otherwise achieved by the reforms contained in
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. A major concern, in other words, is that
Arthur Andersen’s exit and KPMG’s survival may be doing more to
impair audit quality than Sarbanes-Oxley is doing to improve it.
A secondary problem of rescuing large failing institutions is
neglect of smaller institutions. Government subsidization of large
127

See Gary H. Stern, The Too-Big -to-Fail Problem, Region, Sept. 1997, at 26. Mr. Stern
explains moral hazard as follows:
Once a person or institution is insured, the insured has an incentive to take on
more risk than otherwise. This is why, for example, fire and auto insurance
policies have deductibles. With deductibles, the insured have more incentive
to pick up old paint cans and drive cars more carefully. The moral hazard
problem is particularly severe in banking because of the lack of deductibles.
Governments often provide 100 percent depositor protection, es pecially at
large banks where a loss could have industry wide repercussions (a practice
known as too-big-to-fail---TBTF).
Id.; see also Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 237, 272--75
(1996) (noting that moral hazard arises any time one party’s behavior influences risk borne by
another and using products liability as example).
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See supra notes 69--84 and accompanying text.
36

organizations creates proportional disadvantages for the next tier of
industry participants.129 In auditing, this further diminishes the
ability of smaller firms to compete with the four large firms. The
governmental banking policy that restricts the use of the too big to
fail doctrine 130 reflects a prudence that could be appealing if applied
to the auditing industry. Such ex ante restrictions often are necessary
to constrain regulatory inclinations amid crisis to rescue enterprises
deemed too big to fail. 131 Governmental temptation to rescue and the
concomitant need for restraint evokes Homer’s Odyssey, when
government must be “tied to the mast” to fight temptation to hear the
“song of the Sirens.”132
*

*

*

Neutralizing moral hazard from any too big to fail conceit at
the four large audit firms requires creating credible alternatives to the
existing auditing industry structure. 133 Particularly appealing would
be an alternative that also can improve existing audit quality,
increase attention to catastrophic risk, and reduce industry
concentration by lowering barriers to entry. The following Part
explores incremental reforms directed at improving audit quality by
applying perspectives on catastrophic risk from complexity theory.
The ensuing Part offers financial statement insurance as a
129

See Keith N. Hylton, Banks and Inner Cities: Market and Regulatory Obstacles to
Development Lending, 17 Yale J. on Reg. 197, 241 (2000) (discussing how too big to fail policy
creates greater moral hazard in larger banks); Carrie Stradley Lavargna, Government-Sponsored
Enterprises Are “Too Big to Fail”: Balancing Public and Private Interests, 44 Hastings L.J. 991,
1013 (1993) (discussing situation where FDIC did not bail out small bank but bailed out large
bank two months later).
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12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)--(E)(2000) (imposing limits on governmental authority to provide
assistance to insured depository institutions).
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See Miller, supra note 123, at 1107--08.

132

See Homer, The Odyssey 155 (S.O. Andrew trans., J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1948).
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See Hu, supra note 124, at 873 (addressing bailout of Long Term Capital Management and
suggesting that “one possible category of techniques that the Federal Reserve should contemplate
is to specifically and credibly forswear the use of possible tools to deal with a stock market
crash”); Van Der Weide & Kini, supra note 124, at 254 (“In order to implement a successful
market discipline approach to bank regulation, the federal government must credibly commit not
to insure the losses of the relevant market participants.”).
37

revolutionary way to provide these steps and create just such a
credible alternative to the existing industry structure.
II. Reform
A meaningful probability of near-term audit firm exit due to
federal securities fraud class actions that Professor Talley explores is
not entirely new. For example, in 1992, total securities fraud
litigation costs reportedly consumed fourteen percent of audit
revenues (totaling $783 million, meaning potential loss exposure
running into the billions of dollars). 134 The magnitude is much
higher, however, after the reduction in industry size to four large
audit firms from six and, before then, eight. With such a contraction,
the moral hazard that exists when firms believe that they are too big
to fail amplifies. Accordingly, even if the probability of audit firm
exit were low, the magnitude is so high that immediate policy
attention is warranted.
Some low probability, high magnitude events may casually be
referred to as worst case scenarios. These often are dismissed, ex
ante, as too remote to invest preventive resources (although, ex post,
policymakers scurry to make the requisite investment). This occurs
in many contexts, including stock market trading (market crash of
1987), airport security (terrorism of 2001), space exploration safety
(Columbia shuttle disintegration in 2003), and artificial levy systems
(hurricane destruction of New Orleans in 2005). It could include
risks of asteroid collisions with large cities 135 and of large audit firms
exiting the industry (Arthur Andersen’s exit in 2002; KPMG’s near
exit in 2005).
Policy analysts may find it desirable to incorporate such risks
in normative evaluations ex ante. While analysts use standard tools
134

See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 5, at 318 n. 51 (citing Private Litigation Under the
Federal Securities Laws: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 103--431 (1993) (statement of Jake L.
Netterville, Chairman of the Board, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants)).
135

See Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response 139--98 (2004); Richard A. Posner,
Efficient Responses to Catastrophic Risk, 6 Chi. J. Int’l L. 511, 515 (2006).
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such as the normal curve in statistical probability distributions, an
increasingly large number of systems are known to behave in
accordance with other probability distributions that require
redefining the nature of the unexpected. A relatively new field called
complexity theory studies systems that obey such distributions.136
The following discussion introduces this theory and considers how
selected aspects of auditing may be fit for similar study.
A. Complexity Theory
In complexity theory, the remote becomes a more central focus
than routine, expectable events. Technically, complexity theory
investigates the distinctive nonlinearities of dynamic systems. These
systems often can be modeled using traditional tools (such as
equilibrium models or geometric equations) but certain outcomes are
so sensitive to infinitesimally small changes in the initial conditions
as to elude capture or prediction by those tools. Manifestations of
these peculiarities include probability distributions that do not follow
a normal or bell-shaped curve but instead follow a “power law
distribution.”137
Earthquakes illustrate this distribution: numerous small
quakes occur routinely but very large ones are rare and the
distribution of very large quakes along the right tail of the
distribution falls more slowly than under a normal distribution’s right
tail. 138 In the auditing industry, one observes a large number of small
136

See Manfred Schroeder, Fractals, Chaos, Power Laws: Minutes from an Infinite Paradise
103--19 (1991).
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Power law models were developed in physics but related insights have been extended to
inform policy challenges in numerous contexts, including environmental law and securities
regulation. See, e.g., Benoit B. Mandelbrot, The (Mis)Behavior of Markets (2004); Fred
Bosselman, What Lawmakers Can Learn from Large-Scale Ecology, 17 J. Land Use & Envtl. L.
207, 224--25 (2002); Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The
Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 546
(1994); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to
Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 Hous. L. Rev. 933
(1997).
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Other attributes of such distributions include absence of the normal curve’s peak and presence
of a continuously decreasing curve capturing the coexistence of numerous small events alongside
a small number of massive ones. A stylized example of a population’s height distribution would
show a majority of short creatures accompanied by occasional 100-foot tall specimens and the
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liability judgments or settlements (in the one to ten million dollar
range) and a very small number of very larges ones (in the range of
more than one hundred million)---and the trailing off along the right
tail may be slower than in normal distributions. This is especially so
if one uses a capacious sense of exit inducements, such as including
criminal indictments, scandal-laden client disaffection, and
confluences of these forces.
For power distributions, statistical properties are unusual.
Whereas normal distributions sport finite expected values and
variances, power distributions can have infinite expected values or
infinite variance. 139 As with any statistical measure, this has limits,
such as the fact that these attributes may not hold true over the entire
range of the data. Accordingly, as with other statistical measures,
these are approximations of reality rather than pure forms.
Despite these limitations, complexity theory can offer useful
lessons for catastrophic risk, including for cataclysmic auditor
liability---and audit firm exit---risk. The next two subsections
explore two particular lessons: subsection II.B endorses using
conservative and strategic audit procedures to enhance auditors’
reputation with managers for toughness and subsection II.C
prescribes publishing worst-case scenario analyses in audit reports to
improve the product that auditors provide to external users.
B. Internal Reputation
It is commonly said that an audit firm’s most valuable asset is
a reputation for honesty. 140 Third parties who rely on audit reports
likely assume that auditors are honest with them, but an honest
rare but real mile-high creature. See Albert-László Barabási, Linked: The New Science of
Networks 67--68 (2002).
139

See Benoit B. Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature 337--38 (1983).
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See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (“An
accountant’s greatest asset is its reputation for honesty, followed closely by its reputation for
careful work.”); Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the
Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J.L. & Econ. 613, 621 (1983) (emphasizing external
reputation concern as incentive for auditors to disclose known accounting deceptions).
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auditor who cannot deter managerial sloppiness or aggression
deserves little credit (or compensation) for her honesty. More
important than honesty, auditors must command a reputation,
believed by management, for ruthlessly scouring managerial
assertions and not allowing questionable reporting. 141 Management
will incline towards softening an auditor’s reputation for
thoroughness and, when successful, be able to get away with less
diligence and more aggression. 142
Auditors earn reputations for toughness through traditional
investigative auditing practices that require continuing investment to
sustain. During periods, such as the 1990s, when industry-wide
laxity manifests, rebuilding that reputation requires significant
additional investment. This explains the renewed emphasis on
auditor independence and is an important theoretical justification for
the requirement, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, that auditors audit
internal control over financial reporting. 143 When, as now, auditors
face industry-unraveling consequences from laxity, complexity
theory’s insights about catastrophic risk justify such investment.
1. Traditional Auditing Practice. --- Brief background on
traditional auditing practice puts these points in perspective. The
industry’s standard model defines audit risk as: “the probability that
an auditor may unknowingly fail to modify an opinion on financial
statements that are materially misstated.”144 Audit risk is composed
of three sub-risks: (1) inherent risk is the susceptibility of an
assertion (such as an account balance) to error that could be material,
141

See Srikant M. Datar & Michael Alles, The Formation and Role of Reputation and Litigation
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and meaning of auditors’ internal reputations with managers).
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See William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 Duke L.J. 439,
473 (2003) (“Management will always prefer an auditor with a reputation for flexibility
respecting aggressive treatments and avoid an auditor with a reputation for conservative
probity.”); Robert Libby et al., Experimental Research in Financial Accounting, 27 Acct. Org. &
Soc’y 775, 781--83 (2002); Mark Nelson & Hun-Tong Tan, Judgment and Decision Making
Research in Auditing 33--38 (Mar. 25, 2005), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=761706 (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing auditor-client interactions).
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David N. Ricchiute, Auditing and Assurance Services 45 (7th ed. 2003).
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assuming there is no related internal control; (2) control risk is the
likelihood that error could occur and not be prevented or detected by
internal control; and (3) detection risk is the likelihood that error
could occur and not be detected by the auditor’s procedures.145
Audit risk is the product of the three risk types, expressed
formally as the “audit risk” model: AR = IR x CR x DR.146 Auditors
evaluate inherent risk (IR) and control risk (CR) and then solve this
equation for an acceptable level of detection risk (DR).147 An
acceptable level of detection risk hinges, in turn, on the desired level
of confidence to support an unqualified opinion. 148 The confidence
level is the likelihood that audit procedures did not fail. The
requisite confidence level depends, further still, on magnitude,
usually meaning materiality. The standard of materiality used in
auditing is akin to that used in both securities law and financial
accounting. All treat as material matters that a reasonable person
would consider important in making a decision based on some
information base. 149
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Accounting and Audit Systems: Framework and German Experiences, 29 J. Corp. L. 449, 451
(2004).
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Ricchiute, supra note 144, at 46--48; Wüstemann, supra note 145, at 451--52.
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Rewriting the equation in these terms yields: DR = AR ÷ (IR x CR). This makes detection
risk (DR) the dependent variable, controlled by mastering inherent risk and control risk.
Wüstemann, supra note 145, at 451--52.
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Auditors formalize that confidence level as: CL = 1 ÷ DR. Id.
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See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (interpreting materiality
under federal securities laws); Objectives of Fin. Reporting by Bus. Enters., Statement of
Accounting Concepts No. 2, paras. 123--132 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1978) (explaining
materiality concept in accounting). Practitioners posit an inverse relationship between audit risk
and materiality. Ricchiute, supra note 144, at 50. Planning an audit requires estimating
materiality. The auditing industry publishes decision aids relating audit risk to materiality and
implied requisite audit effort. See, e.g., Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit,
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 107 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2006)
(presenting information on minimum sample sizes for tests of internal control given tolerate
deviation rates and expected population deviation rates). It also invokes rules of thumb, the
commonest of which relates to an item’s effect on net income. Effects less than five percent are
seen as unlikely to be material and those greater than ten percent are seen as likely to be material.
See, e.g., SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (1999).
42

Under this model, auditors engage in exercises designed to
gather sufficient information to decide whether they are justified in
issuing an unqualified report on financial statements (that they fairly
present performance and condition in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP)). 150 Threshold testing
probes the capacity of internal control over financial reporting to
catch errors or fraud; further substantive tests seek to detect material
misstatements or identify assertions likely to contain them. 151
Auditors use statistical sampling, random testing, and similar
investigative techniques to form their opinion. In addition to
substantive tests of financial statement assertions, auditors crossexamine managers, reason from recognized principles and
relationships, and rely upon intuition.
Auditors always face uncertainty about whether they have
sufficient evidence to issue an unqualified audit report. Under the
traditional audit risk model, an auditor designs an audit plan to
reduce risk to an acceptable level. When initial testing exposes
potentially material errors or deceptions, auditors expand the scope
of substantive testing and/or managerial interrogation. Managers
who are aware of pending tests and probing are discouraged from
accounting aggression and stimulated to diligence; those aware that
auditors are unlikely to test or probe intensively can indulge
temptations to cheat or be careless.
These realities explain why official auditing standards require
auditors to seal gaps in their knowledge by adopting the fundamental
habit of professional skepticism. 152 This involves routinely second
150

See Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, AU § 411 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 2001).
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Substantive tests are of two types: (1) “tests of detail” are designed to detect material
misstatements in accounts and (2) “analytical procedures” are evaluations of data drawing on
comparisons such as in relevant trends, baselines, or forecasts. Ricchiute, supra note 144, at 45.
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See Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, AU § 508 (Am. Inst. Certified Pub.
Accountants 2001); Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, Statement of Fin.
Accounting Standards No. 82 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1997) (“ Due professional care
requires the auditor to exercise professional skepticism---that is, an attitude that includes a
questioning mind and critical assessment of audit evidence.”); see also Vicky B. HeismanHoffman et al., The Warning Signs of Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 182 J. Acct. 75, 75--77
(1996) (assessing commonly cited cause of audit failure as auditors lacking awareness of
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guessing managerial assertions and judgments. Failure to adhere to
the requirement exposes auditors to legal liability and sanction. 153
Since all the testing in the world could not uncover all mistakes or
fraud, the indispensable auditing trait is a commanding reputation
among managers for thoroughly rooting them out. 154 That, more than
the actual testing, is the value of auditing. 155 Auditors suffered
severe reputation damage during the 1990s, after compromising their
independence from clients by joining in relationships with them. 156
These relationships increased managerial temptation for carelessness
and deception.
2. Rebuilding Reputation --- Complexity theory endorses the
conservative testing and skepticism at the heart of the audit risk
model and traditional practice---and supports expanding methods in
two main ways. First, it offers a defense of the controversial
procedures mandated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that require auditors
to provide separate testing of and opinions upon the effectiveness of
internal control over financial reporting. 157 These exercises involve
comprehensive examination of all procedures and policies governing
warning signs that could be uncovered by applying requisite professional skepticism).
153

See, e.g., SEC v. KPMG LLP, SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2379
(Feb. 22, 2006) (failure to exercise professional skepticism in connection with failed audits of
Xerox Corp.); In re Deloitte & Touche LLP, SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Release No. 2237 (Apr. 26, 2005) (failure to exercise professional skepticism in connection with
failed audits of Adelphia Communications Corp.); In re PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, SEC
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1787 (May 22, 2003) (failure to exercise
professional skepticism in connection with failed audits of SmarTalk TeleServices Inc.).
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See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of
the Sarbanes -Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. Corp. L. 1, 31 (2002) [hereinafter Ribstein, Market]
(“[T]he . . . serious issue is whether even strong regulation will change auditors’ practical ability
to find corporate fraud when determined corporate insiders want to hide it.”).
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It is therefore incomplete to say that auditors earn their keep by “renting their reputations.”
See Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2
J.L. Econ. & Org. 53, 93--94 (1986). This viewpoint also makes less relevant the behavioral
critique of the honesty proposition that attempts to explain how “irrational” auditors might
jeopardize their external reputations for honesty and diligence unwittingly. See Robert F.
Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral In sight into Securities Fraud
Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 133, 141--42 (2000).
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See supra text accompanying notes 69--84.
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Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. 2002).
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the internal processing of financial information and production of
financial statements.158 Auditors now provide written reports on
internal control, including publicly disclosing and explaining
material weaknesses in it.
Many analysts criticize these new procedures as unnecessary
and too costly. 159 Complexity theory offers a different view that
supports proponents of these exercises. The procedures are
necessary to rebuild auditors’ reputations for toughness, and are costeffective given how infirmities in these reputations pose risks of
audit failure with concomitant risk of audit firm exit that could
unravel the industry.
Complexity theory prescribes a conservative approach to risk--probably more conservative than traditional auditing practice. In
auditing, this could mean identifying and addressing all audit risk
components necessary to justify issuing an unqualified report.
Benefits arise from making managers aware of such procedures to
increase the deterrent function of auditing. The ultimate payoff is to
eliminate the cataclysmic risk of audit failure that could induce audit
firm exit. But costs of eliminating this risk are extraordinary, and
may be prohibitive.
Costs of undertaking such conservative procedures stem from
taking steps that are strictly unnecessary in the sense that the
underlying data ultimately support the existing financial statement
assertions (call these “safe zones”). 160 By so expanding an audit’s
scope to test areas wrongly supposed to be dangerous---false
positives---the auditor can reduce the chances of missing real danger
zones---true positives. A measure of conservatism is the ratio of true
158

Id. For an attempt to provide a comprehensive description of the requirements, see Lawrence
A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing’s New Early Warning System: Control Disclosure,
Auditor Liability and Safe Harbors, 55 Hastings L.J. 1449 (2004).
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See, e.g., William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of
“Going Private,” 55 Emory L.J. 141, 147 (2006); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and
the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521, 1587--88 (2005).
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Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental
Uncertainty, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 145, 160--61 (2003) (using these concepts to develop model
for environmental law).
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positives to false positives. A one-to-one ratio means half the
inquiries are danger zones and half are safe zones; a one-to-four ratio
means that only a fifth were real danger zones and others tested as
safe zones. Conservative procedures over audit, but minimize the
chance of missing a real danger, and suffering the consequent
cataclysmic loss.
The new mandatory audits of internal control are a substitute
for such comprehensive scouring but furnish much of the same
function at less cost. Some prescribed steps are not strictly necessary
in that they involve testing many more safe zones than danger zones.
But they provide two benefits. First, they vastly reduce the chances
of failing to identify danger zones. These exercises have identified
numerous control weaknesses and have produced financial
restatements showing that these steps enable auditors to exercise
their ability to pressure management into more faithful reporting. 161
Second, this manifest ability reflects that auditors are regaining a
reputation with management for toughness.
Costs of auditing internal control over financial reporting are
nevertheless significant. 162 Some speculate that this is a product of
auditors performing excessive work that is, in turn, motivated by fear
of litigation. 163 While possible, the investment’s instrumental value
is principally a way to rebuild auditors’ impaired reputations for
toughness versus management. Formal audits and opinions on
internal control are far more conservative than the limited testing of
internal control that auditors performed under the traditional audit
risk model. That conservatism is justified, under complexity theory,
given the staggering systemic consequences that audit firm exit
poses.
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See Weili Ge & Sarah McVay, The Disclosure of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control
After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 19 Acct. Horizons 137 (2005) (noting sample of 261 companies
disclosing material weaknesses, most of which reflect lack of resource commitment to
accounting controls).
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See Susan W. Eldridge & Burch T. Kealey, SOX Costs: Auditor Attestation Under Section
404 (Univ. of Neb., Working Paper No. *, 2005) (noting that auditing fees paid by sample of 97
companies increased, on average, from $3.5 million to $5.8 million, attributed to section 404
compliance costs).
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See Pritchard, supra note 79, at 21.
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Consider an analogy from aviation security. 164 In this context,
the risk distribution does not follow a bell curve but resembles a
power curve: Nearly all passengers pose no risk while a tiny few
threaten catastrophic loss. Security personnel must regularly decide
whether to permit passengers through a security checkpoint
(equivalent to issuing an unqualified audit report). Security
procedures must develop a reputation for interdiction to deter
hijacking or terrorist attempts. Doing so requires a large number of
stoppages.
While any screening procedure inconveniences some safe
passengers, catching a single dangerous one justifies a large number
of stoppages. Stopping all passengers is impractical but stopping
vastly more safe than dangerous ones is necessary because the
greater the stoppage rate, the greater the chances of catching
dangerous passengers. In auditing, expanding audit procedures--including formal audits of and opinions on internal control---can be
justified to reduce the chances of failing to identify danger zones,
despite the cost of exploring what turn out to be safe zones.
The costs of expanded testing of one zone may deprive
“gatekeepers” (whether airport security or auditors) of resources to
expand testing in another. In airports, stopping one passenger may
mean the next one goes through unchecked. The latter may be a
danger, yet on board he or she goes. But the chances that a randomly
selected passenger is a danger are lower than the chances that a
hijacker or terrorist appears among a larger group of stopped
passengers. As a result, the costs of letting an untested passenger
through are lower than the benefits of testing the larger group.
Moreover, having invested in a reputation for toughness that deters,
resources are liberated for reallocation.
Of course, any security or investigative technique can be made
more conservative when performing more procedures is possible, as
with airport security and auditing. This raises a second set of
164

See Farber, supra note 160, at 162--63 (providing basis for this analogy).

47

improvements in auditing that complexity theory supports in the area
of strategic detection. Performing the maximum possible number of
procedures is not likely a prudent method, even if extensive testing
increases both deterrence and the chance of detection. In airport
security, it is necessary to use strategic methods of identifying and
stopping particularly high-risk passengers, such as those named on
governmental watch lists.
For auditing, auditors must supplement expanded testing by
deploying strategic methods of detection that demonstrate to
managers that even the cleverest schemes are unlikely to succeed.
This is the theory behind innovations developed by auditing scholars
in recent years. These prescribe that auditors develop refined tools to
aid in deciding when to expand testing to investigate for deception.
For example, scholars explore how weak internal control can signal
high fraud risk but, unless auditors use strategic procedures that
distinguish error from fraud, they will treat discrepancies as due to
error and allow fraud to go undetected.165 Strategic reasoning is
particularly productive in high-risk environments.166 Complexity
theory’s prescriptions for broad-gauged screening to avert
catastrophic loss add support to the analytical arguments these
scholars mount for a strategic approach to auditing.
To summarize, the possibility that auditor liability risk may
resemble a power law distribution means that missing true positives
can be cataclysmic. True, costs of expanding an audit for a client or
context may mean impairing resources to expand audits for others.
But expanded---and more strategic---testing reduces cataclysmic risk.
Such methods strengthen auditors’ reputations among managers for
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See Dennis H. Caplan, Internal Control and the Detection of Management Fraud, 37 J. Acct.
Res. 101, 101 (1999).
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See, e.g., Stephen K. Asare & Arnold M. Wright, The Effectiveness of Alternative Risk
Assessment and Program Planning Tools in a Fraud Setting, 21 Contemp. Acct. Res. 325 passim
(2004) (questioning effectiveness of standard audit tools in context of fraud and calling for
strategic reasoning methods in high-risk contexts); T. Jeffrey Wilks & Mark F. Zimbelman,
Using Game Theory and Strategic Reasoning Concepts to Prevent and Detect Fraud, 18 Acct.
Horizons 173, 173--74 (2004) (urging change in current auditing standards and developing tools
useful in performing critical audit tasks).
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toughness, creating a deterrent effect that ultimately would permit
less testing.
While audits of internal control help, most aspects of
traditional auditing practice remain unaffected by the reforms begun
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and PCAOB’s ensuing standard setting. 167
For example, traditional auditing practice, and its audit risk model, is
designed within a framework of concluding whether an unqualified
audit report can be issued or not. The practice is not geared toward
assessing the relative integrity of individual or overall financial
statement assertions. This raises the second broad lesson for auditing
from complexity theory, concerning external information that
auditors generate, including worst case scenarios.
C. External Information
Scholars debate whether effective alternative means of
communicating accounting information are underutilized.168 After
all, auditors provide no specific assessments of how reliable a
particular set of financial statements are when compared to others.
Complexity theory suggests that auditors could provide more useful
information by developing tools that assess and publicize worst case
scenarios. This can be done by creating more tailored audit reports
than presently exist.
1. Monotonic Audit Reports. --- The standard form of an
unqualified audit report contains three prescribed paragraphs.169
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See Charlie Cullinan, Enron as a Symptom of Audit Process Breakdown: Can the SarbanesOxley Act Cure the Disease?, 15 Critical Persp. Acct. 853, 861--62 (2004) (showing how
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s reforms are directed heavily towards auditor independence with
insufficient attention paid to critical steps in auditing process shown to contribute to audit
failures).
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For a view contrary to that suggested here, see, e.g., Joseph V. Carcello et al., Auditors’
Reporting Options and Client Disclosure, 18 Res. Acct. Reg. (2005) (examining one context in
which such options had been restricted and concluding that fewer auditor options did not impair
enterprise disclosure).
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Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, AU § 508 (Am. Inst. Certified Pub.
Accountants 2001) (“The auditor’s standard report identifies the financial statements audited in
an opening . . . paragraph, describes the nature of an audit in a scope paragraph, and expresses
the auditor’s opinion in a separate paragraph.”).
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Each year, more than 90% of audit reports for public companies
receive this standard form of auditor blessing. 170 These reports sing a
single tune for the financial statements of a regional restaurant chain
as for those of a multinational conglomerate and every shape and size
of enterprise in between. To use an academic analogy, auditors
grade financial statements on a pass/fail basis---the approach taken to
non-competitive school course work---and all but a handful pass.
As for the small minority of financial statements that do not
pass, auditing industry standards allow for a limited variety of
likewise standardized modified reports (currently limited to
“qualified” or “adverse”). 171 An even rarer subset of the population
of audit reports expresses a qualification as to whether an enterprise
is capable of continuing as a “going concern,” and these, notoriously,
predict only half of the actual observed bankruptcies.172
Two important, but still modest, recent improvements in
communicating accounting information have been made. First, SEC
regulations require narrative disclosure concerning critical
accounting policies.173 This innovation, enacted as the accounting
scandals of the late 1990s and early 2000s were brewing, requires
detailed disclosure as to areas where assumptions and judgments
170

See Willekens, supra note 83.
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See Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, AU § 508 (listing alternatives to
standard audit report).
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See Kannan Raghunandan & Dasaratha V. Rama, Audit Reports for Companies in Financial
Distress: Before and After SAS No. 59, 14 Auditing: J. Prac. & Theory 50, 51 (1995)
(summarizing prior studies). Auditors routinely fail to provide going-concern warnings unless
the signs of impending doom are painfully obvious. Id. at 58. For example, no going-concern
opinion appeared ahead of nearly half the 228 bankruptcies occurring from January 2001 to June
2002, even though afflicted enterprises showed telltale warning signs: negative working capital,
negative retained earnings, and net income loss. See Weiss Ratings, Inc., The Worsening Crisis
of Confidence on Wall Street: The Role of Auditing Firms 7 & tbl.4 (2002); see also Marshall
A. Geiger & K. Raghunandan, Going-Concern Opinions in the “New” Legal Environment, 16
Acct. Horizons 17, 24 (2002) (finding auditors less likely to issue going-concern reports to
stressed companies in 2000 than in 1992).
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See Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 8350, Exchange Act Release
No. 48,960, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056, 75,064--65 (Dec. 9, 2003); Cautionary Advice Regarding
Disclosure About Critical Accounting Policies, Securities Act Release 8040, Exchange Act
Release No. 45,149, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,013, 65,013--14 (Dec. 9, 2001).
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expose an enterprise’s financial statements to particular volatility or
variability. 174
Such sensitivity disclosure can give financial statement users a
basis for gauging the reliability of those financial statements,
including some clues concerning worst case scenarios. While
helpful, this disclosure is management’s responsibility and not
subject to the ordinary financial statement audit. 175 As company
specific narrative, moreover, it is not easily rendered into an
objective form that enables intercompany comparisons.
Second, the new reports on internal control over financial
reporting aim in the same direction as worst case scenario analysis.176
They serve, in part, as an early warning system to external users
about the reliability of given financial statements. When auditors
determine that a material control weakness exists (one posing a
more-than-remote risk of material financial misstatements), their
report must describe the weakness and give “specific information”
about “its actual and potential effect on the presentation of the
company’s financial statements issued during [its] existence.”177
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See Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial
Condition and Results of Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 75,056--57, 75,062--63, 75,065
(referencing variability); Cautionary Advice Regarding Disclosure About Critical Accounting
Policies, 66 Fed. Reg. at 65,013 (“[W]e believe it is appropriate to alert companies to the need
for greater investor awareness of the sensitivity of financial statements to the methods,
assump tions, and estimates underlying their preparation.”).
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See SEC Regulation S-K, Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2006) (indicating that management
is responsible for providing MD&A disclosure). Auditors do participate in the process of
formulating the MD&A disclosure. See Cautionary Advice Regarding Disclosure About Critical
Accounting Policies, 66 Fed. Reg. at 65,013 (“As part of the normal audit process, auditors must
obtain an understanding of management’s judgments in selecting and applying accounting
principles and methods. Special attention to the most critical accounting policies will enhance
the effectiveness of this process.”). Auditors may provide limited written assurance on MD&A
disclosure. See Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis About the Application of
Critical Accounting Policies, Securities Act Release No. 8098, Exchange Act Release No.
45,907, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,634 & n.100 (May 2, 2002).
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See Management’s Reports on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification of
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8238, Exchange Act
Release No. 47,986, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,068, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June
18, 2003).
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See Auditing and Related Prof’l Practice Standards, Auditing Standard No. 2, para. 176 (Pub.
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2004).
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Again, while helpful, these reports are of limited utility. Like
financial audit reports, these generally say the same thing as a matter
of form;178 they do not provide statistical or comparative information
about financial statement reliability.
So, in financial reporting, there is no index of financial
statement reliability. Yet, in auditing, some risk always exists after
conducting an expansive set of tests or obtaining extensive
corroboration. For example, a financial statement assertion that
auditors flag for expanded testing may reveal itself as safe but in fact
still be dangerous. Despite the many degrees of relative danger and
safety, auditors have no choice among the class of unqualified
reports to provide any useful gradations, and internal control reports
have provided only incrementally greater transparency.
Since no audits are alike and no financial statements exhibit
exactly comparable reliability risk, all unqualified audit reports are
not alike. To reflect this, auditors could analyze and disclose grades
on the overall reliability of given financial statements, resembling
how teachers assign grades to students for their course work. In
auditing, grading financial statements would include generating and
disclosing formal worst case scenarios for each. Such granular
assessments of accounting information would improve user
understanding of an enterprise’s financial condition and performance
and thus make capital allocation more efficient. It also would exert
competitive pressure on managers to achieve high grades for
reliability, not just to report high profits.
2. Graded Financial Statements --- To produce graded
financial statements, auditors could adapt analytical methodologies
used in corporate finance. Credit rating agencies test a borrower’s
capacity to pay its debts as they come in the ordinary course of
business.179 They simulate varying firm-specific or economy-wide
178
179

Id.

See
Standard
&
Poor’s,
Corporate
Ratings
Criteria
4
(2003),
at
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/CorpCrit2004.pdf (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). I suggest adapting the analytical methodologies of rating agencies
without opining upon that industry’s structure or integrity, which has been the subject of
considerable criticism. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 Wash. U.
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environments, including worst case scenarios, to test an enterprise’s
ability to withstand a range of adversity, and then assign ratings (A,
B, C and so on). For auditing, an analogous exercise could assess the
quality of reported figures and their reliability, assuming certain
worst case scenarios of auditing error or accounting volatility.
Although worst case scenario analysis is conducted in
numerous fields,180 it can be sufficiently controversial to warrant
careful reflection. Consider experience with it in environmental
administrative law. Regulations once required agencies, when
preparing environmental impact statements, to include, amid
uncertainty about the actual impact, “worst case analysis and an
indication of the probability or improbability of its occurrence”181
and later “reasonable projections of the worst possible consequences
of a proposed action.”182
Critics complain that worst case scenario analysis is too
pessimistic, that it entails a limitless exercise of conjuring up the
ultimate worst case, and that expert risk management analysts shun
the notion as of limited utility. 183 Regulations were revised to
jettison the express “worst” case or consequence requirement, and
instead required evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant
adverse impacts. Yet “reasonably foreseeable” was defined to
include effects bearing “catastrophic consequences, even if their
probability of occurrence is low . . . . ”184 As a result, the implicit
L.Q. 43, 64--71 (2004); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?
Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 619, 654--81 (1999).
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Farber, supra note 160, at 164 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (1984) (amended 1986)).
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Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act
Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,032 (Mar. 23, 1981).
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See, e.g., Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Rise and Fall of Worst Case Analysis, 18 U. Dayton L.
Rev. 1, 2--3 (1992) (reviewing cases as reaction to federal agency rejection of worst case
scenario analysis); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases and Law, 112
Yale L.J. 61, 96--98 (2002) (reviewing cases in broader context of worrying that people might
worry too much about worst cases).
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Farber, supra note 160, at 166 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (2003)).
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directive remains to discuss low-probability but high-magnitude
events---even if the rhetoric of “worst” is gone. 185
The relationship of complexity theory and worst case scenario
analysis gives rise to conflicting implications.186 First, power laws
deny the existence of a genuine “worst case,” in that “ever-worse”
cases always exist. In other words, it is fair to criticize the entire
concept (as an analytical construct) given the inherent arbitrariness of
denominating a particular illustration as the worst. But, second, as
Professor Farber points out, “one characteristic of power laws is that
the unlikely events on the right tail of the curve have a strong
cumulative effect.”187 Concentrating on the probable can prevent
appreciating the catastrophic. Thus worst-case analysis provides an
essential focus, compensating for the tendency to overlook the
spectrum of worst case types.
Existing auditing practice does not reflect these insights. As
noted, a single large scale judgment could wipe out the auditing
industry---not just a single firm---and even a dozen moderately sized
judgments could have this effect. This omission can be corrected by
further refining the Audit Industry RTR Model. In the preceding
Part, I suggested refining the Audit Industry RTR Model by one
degree of resolution to produce an Audit Firm RTR Model. 188 This
can be taken another degree of resolution further, to assess which
clients are likely to populate the right tail for a given firm (call this
an Audit Client RTR Model). Auditors can adapt the audit risk
model, either as it currently exists or as enhanced by the insights
from complexity theory just described, to identify these clients.
Which clients are candidates for an RTR watch list? In
general, they are clients whose financial statements, if materially
misstated, would produce cataclysmic auditor liability. That includes
185

Id. at 167 (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989)).
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Id. at 167--168.

187

Id. at 167.

188
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all very large clients, and could include a number of moderate to
large clients if their combined size could produce, in aggregate,
cataclysmic results. Furthermore, auditors and researchers recognize
certain high-risk accounting areas. These can congregate in certain
industries or types of business, which can pose greater accounting
risk than others.189 Risk of accounting or auditing error also
congregates in certain subject areas, such as standards regarding
revenue or expense recognition. 190 Given such variables, a formal
model should be tractable to enable assessing Audit Client RTR as
well as assign grades to financial statements more generally.
Informally, clients on the RTR watch list are those whose
audits under the audit risk model (or conservative and strategic
refinements of it) require expanded audit testing and exhibit other
signals of high risk. Auditors typically know who they are, as Arthur
Andersen’s failed audits of Waste Management made
overwhelmingly clear. 191 Yet in the late 1990s and early 2000s,
while auditors knew their “scary” clients, they imparted no such
knowledge to the public.
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See supra note 50.
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See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Report Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (2003). This study of SEC enforcement actions indicated that the accounting areas most
susceptible to misconduct are revenue recognition (126 cases) and expense recognition (101).
Id. at 2. Other areas are MD&A disclosure (43), related party disclosure (23), business
combination accounting (23), non-monetary and roundtrip transactions (19), foreign payments
(6), off-balance sheet arrangements (3), and improper use of non-GAAP financial measures (2).
Id. at 6.
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See Arthur Andersen LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 44,444, Accounting and Auditing
Enforcement Release No. 1405, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 74,920 (June 19, 2001). Arthur
Andersen recognized that Waste Management engaged in “aggressive” accounting practices to
enhance earnings and saw the company as a “high-risk client,” putting it on the firm’s
“monitored client list---a list that it used to monitor clients that posed a significant audit risk to
the Firm.” Id. The auditors routinely furnished company management with “proposed adjusting
journal entries” (PAJEs) which the company equally routinely refused to accept or make, leading
the audit firm to compromise by reclassifying the PAJEs according to categories of “must do,”
reasonable to conservative. Notably, Arthur Andersen considered Waste Management a “crown
jewel” client; from its initial public offering in 1971 through 1997, every chief accounting officer
at Waste Management was a former Arthur Andersen partner. “During the 1990s, approximately
14 former Arthur Andersen employees worked for Waste Management, most often in key
financial and accounting positions.” Id.
55

Again, this is because, in major part, the standard audit report
is always the same three paragraph document. Such information
asymmetries between the public and the auditors would be curtailed
if auditors would capture and publicly disclose the resulting
assessments in a formal index reflecting worst-case scenario
analyses. As explained next, financial statement insurance can
supply an index to capture not only worst case scenarios, but also
grades on financial statement reliability from strong to weak (A to
F).
III. Revolution
A viable alternative to the auditing oligopoly is needed. It
must provide a credible threat to allow the exit of any of the four
large firms that are on the brink of failure. Ideally, the alternative
would enable restructuring the industry in the short or medium term,
before one of the four large firms faces exit. This restructuring can
be achieved by shifting from the existing model (involving clients
paying auditors for audits backed by auditors’ balance sheets or
liability insurance) to one where clients buy tailored insurance
directly and insurers hire and supervise auditors. Not incidentally,
such a financial statement insurance approach would also improve
audit quality, promote public assessment of worst case scenarios, and
reduce barriers to entry that smaller firms currently face.
In previous articles, I recommended financial statement
insurance (FSI) as a potentially useful method of improving the
effectiveness of auditing. 192 My endorsement was limited to the
cautious proposal that legislation be enacted permitting companies,
on a voluntary basis and with shareholder approval, to opt in to this
method of backstopping financial statements. Several factors now
incline me to support making this a mandatory component of U.S.
federal securities regulation.
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See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement Insurance
Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 413 (2004) [hereinafter Cunningham,
Choosing Gatekeepers]; Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Model Financial Statement Insurance Act,
11 Conn. Ins. L.J. 69 (2004) [hereinafter, Cunningham, A Model FSI Act].
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First, scholarly and general interest in the concept of using FSI
to reduce the frequency and magnitude of audit failure has grown. 193
Second, as Professor Talley’s Audit Industry RTR Model suggests,
the probability of an audit firm exit is high; my own analysis
indicates that the magnitude of such an event is enormous. The
resulting moral hazard may be impairing current audit quality and
financial statement reliability even though considerable resources are
being invested in internal control. Third, these points imply that it is
becoming urgent to develop credible alternatives to the existing
auditing industry structure. Yet none of the few available such
alternatives are as attractive as FSI.194 Fourth, mandating FSI
achieves auditing reform while preserving companies’ abilities to
design approaches tailored to their needs.195
Accordingly, the following discussion endorses the adoption
of mandatory FSI as the best way to restructure the auditing industry
and thereby neutralize moral hazard and improve audit practice. Part
III.A exposes the peculiar limitations of using traditional liability and
self-insurance techniques to backstop auditor liability. Part III.B
then discusses FSI, outlining its features and describing its
193

See Amy Shapiro, Who Pays the Auditor Calls the Tune?: Auditing Regulation and Clients’
Incentives, 35 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1029, 1085--94 (2005) (suggesting FSI as one of several
possible schemes for protecting investors from corporate fraud); David Skeel, Icarus in the
Boardroom: The Fundamental Flaws in Corporate America and Where They Came From 212-14, 234 (2005) (same); see also Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC
Should Mandate Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance
Policies, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1147, 1148 (2006) ([*parenthetical]); Barney Jopson, An Industry
Still Skulking in the Shadow of Enron, Fin. T. (July 27, 2006) at 12 ([*parenthetical]); Don A.
Moore, SarbOx Doesn’t Go Far Enough, Bus. Wk. (Apr. 17, 2006), at 112 ([*parenthetical]).
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See Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers, supra note 192, at 423--27 (reviewing several
alternative proposals and concluding that they are inferior to FSI); see also Stephen J. Choi & Jill
E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street: A Voucher Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries,
113 Yale L.J. 269, 336--38 (2003) (proposing use of voucher financing to pay intermediaries
such as securities analysts but expressly disclaiming concept for auditors because of auditing
complexities that may impair its utility in that context); Ribstein, SarbOx, supra note 117, at 289
(mentioning with little enthusiasm idea of having stock exchanges coordinate and compensate
auditors) (citing Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, How the Quest for Efficiency Corroded the
Market, Harv. Bus. Rev., July 2003, at 76)); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure
Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 29 n.180 (suggesting but discounting
possibility of having auditors paid through public funding).
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See id. at 467 n. 213 (providing chart summarizing framework and highlighting FSI policy
provisions that can be tailored and disclosed); Cunningham, A Model FSI Act, supra note 192, at
79--80 (outlining FSI policy provisions that can be tailored and disclosed).
57

advantages. Finally, Part III.C compares FSI to other proposed
reforms and responds to criticism of the proposal.
A. Limits of Liability Insurance
Traditionally, auditors could buy liability insurance to
backstop their exposure to legal claims. These policies are called
errors and omissions (“E&O”) insurance. When underwriting this
form of coverage, insurers use general analytical methods not
tailored to particular engagements or associated risks of audit failure.
Rather, they apply conventional actuarial models that rely on risk
pooling and diversification. 196 These techniques reflect how liability
insurance works when covered risks are substantially independent, so
that coverage distributes and thus diversifies risk across participants
pooled according to similar circumstances.197 Good examples are
coverage for property owners facing earthquakes along the West
coast of the United States or those on its Eastern seaboard facing risk
of floods.
Two problems arise for using liability insurance in auditing.
First, the risk pooling function will be diminished if the risk of
financial misstatement lacks characteristics of independence. This
can occur when financial misstatement risks multiply during
particular socioeconomic climates, congregate in certain industries,
or cluster around certain innovations or practices.198 Such attributes
can render related catastrophic events uninsurable. They are akin to
“acts of war” that insurance policies long have expressly excluded.
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Anne Gron & Alan O. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets: A Role for the Government
as Insurer? 36 Ind. L. Rev. 447, 449 (2003) (noting that “essence of insurance is risk pooling
and diversification, so that aggregate losses become predictable and insurers” can be confident
that premiums plus income will cover loss payouts plus expenses).
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See Gron & Sykes, supra note 196, at 455 (noting that insurance policies typically do not
cover damages caused by war because associated risks are too highly correlated); George L.
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Reform, 59 Yale L.J. 1521, 1539--40
(1987) (explaining fundamentals of insurance and imperative that covered risks be uncorrelated).
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See David B. Kahn & Gary S. Lawson, Who’s the Boss? Controlling Auditor Incentives
Through Random Selection, 53 Emory L.J. 391, 428--29 (2004) (arguing that financial
misstatement risk is correlated since lawsuits are more likely during recessions).
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These catastrophes do not satisfy the pooling and diversification
model because losses are highly correlated across policyholders.199
In general, when losses associated with an event will tend to
be highly correlated across policyholders---as with acts of war and
perhaps certain high-risk audits---rational insurers using pooling and
diversification strategies will shun them. 200 Those offering the
insurance will charge extraordinarily large premiums for doing so,
which will be unappealing to the marketplace when premiums
exceed a policy’s expected value. The upshot: Some losses are
uninsurable. 201
Recently, auditors have self-insured,202 which is often a signal
that related risks are uninsurable. However, Professor Talley’s
analysis suggests that this is not a good explanation for current selfinsurance practice in the auditing industry. Professor Talley’s
frequency method generates out-of-sample predictions that provide a
basis for assessing whether the data support the conclusion that the
risks are uninsurable. 203 Is the right-tail risk so thick that it cannot be
diversified through third-party liability insurance markets? The data
do not support this conclusion: Allowing that liability risk plays
some role in the audit firm’s decision substantially to self-insure
these risks, Professor Talley concludes that other factors play a role,
including agency costs and adverse selection. 204
These points lead to the second problem that arises when
liability insurance is used in auditing---which also afflicts self199

Gron & Sykes, supra note 196, at 455.
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Id. (“Some potential losses are so catastrophic and non-diversifiable that no insurer will insure
them for a price that customers will pay.”).
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See supra note 106.
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Professor Talley explains his conceptualization of liability risk as solely exogenous in order to
assess “whether observed exposure events characterize the types of risk that theory would predict
to be uninsurable.” Talley, supra note 1, at 5.
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Id. at 4. Nor can the possibility be ruled out that the current auditor insurance market is
experiencing a transitory coverage shortage. See Gron & Sykes, supra note 195, at 451--55.
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insuring by the auditing industry. Both liability insurance and selfinsurance pose a similar problem for auditing by relying upon
general actuarial models of risk pooling and diversification. 205 Those
actuarial models imply, wrongly under my analysis in Part I, 206 that
auditors lack the ability to influence audit quality, financial statement
reliability, or legal liability. Instead, audits and audit risk are treated
like earthquakes and floods. But unlike earthquakes and floods,
audits and audit risk are susceptible to human control. Based on
these faulty models, the E&O market and self-insurance currently
operate off an inferior baseline of risk pooling and diversification.
Thus, a superior approach would be tailored to particular audit
engagements.
This conclusion invites another lesson from complexity theory.
Contexts where casualty or liability insurance is unavailable may
resemble a power law function in complexity theory. 207 Power laws
tend to exhibit large variances (even potentially infinite variance).
For such distributions, insurance premiums may be higher than for
conventional statistical distributions.208 But risk management,
including through insurance, is critical for systems bearing
significant social import, including the audit function’s role as the
gateway to capital formation and allocation. This means that the
issue is less one of distributing risk using pooling and diversification
and more one of allocating risk to their particular probable sources--particular audit engagements.
B. Financial Statement Insurance
To summarize the concept of financial statement insurance, (1)
companies buy insurance policies for a given premium and coverage
mix, based on a preliminary insurer investigation, yielding a financial
statement reliability index that is informative in ways that the opaque
205

It is as if, qua the Audit Industry RTR Model, the risks are fortuitous or random.
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Farber, supra note 160, at 170--71.
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monotonic three-paragraph audit report is not; (2) the insurer engages
and pays an auditor to conduct a full audit, making the auditor
beholden to insurers, not clients; and (3) financial misstatements
yield policy payouts up to the pre-determined policy coverage level.
In addition to essentially refashioning the auditing industry by
installing the insurance industry as a force, FSI contributes several
structural advantages and potential competitive benefits.
1. Structural Advantages --- First, conventional wisdom sees
the conflict of interest that arises when clients pay auditors as an
unavoidable fact of life. 209 It is not. With FSI, companies buy
insurance policies and insurers hire and pay auditors to perform
audits, making the auditor’s boss insurers, not management or audit
committees. Following the proverb whose bread I eat, his song I
sing, when auditors are paid by insurers rather than those they audit,
audit quality should improve. Auditors would boast stronger
reputations as watchdogs with attendant deterrent effect and would
wield greater power to pressure managers when necessary to apply
accounting policies promoting more reliable financial statements.
These effects would support the conservative and strategic
approaches that complexity theory endorses for improving traditional
audit practice and its audit risk model. 210
Second, conventional auditing results in the monotonic threeparagraph audit report which provides no comparative or statistical
information about financial statement reliability. 211 Except in the
unusual cases when auditors provide qualified or adverse opinions,
all audit reports say exactly the same thing. With FSI, insurers gauge
financial statement reliability and reflect this in the policy premium
they charge a particular company for a particular level of coverage.
This premium-coverage mix creates a transparent financial statement
reliability index providing financial statement users with specific,
209

See, e.g., Darin Bartholomew, Is Silence Golden When It Comes to Auditing?, 36 J. Marshall
L. Rev. 57, 89--90 (2002); Norman Bowie, Accountants, Full Disclosure, and Conflicts of
Interest, 5 Bus. & Prof. Ethics J. 60, 68 (1986); Dale R. Rietberg, Note, Auditor Changes and
Opinion Shopping---A Proposed Solution, 22 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 211, 213--14 (1988).
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digestible public information about the quality of a company’s
financial reporting. It implements the concepts of worst case
analysis and graded financial statements.212
Third, by insuring financial statements instead of auditors, the
FSI risk model is based on specific information, not inference from
abstract generalities. It eliminates concern about whether right-tail
risk renders auditors uninsurable. Instead of using pooled-risk and
diversification models, FSI’s risk model is based upon investigation,
including the audit. Most insurance underwriting exercises involve
classifying risks using general actuarial tools rather than specific
investigation. FSI does the opposite.
FSI is thus akin to title insurance, not liability or casualty
insurance. 213 Title insurance is unusual among insurance lines in that
a substantial portion of premiums are dedicated to investigation, not
to expected payouts and profits.214 The central activities in assessing
risk are specific investigations of property and transaction character,
including research on filings, surveys, zonings, and permits; they are
not based on pooled and diversified actuarial probabilities netted
out. 215 This approach to insurance is infeasible for most lines, but is
the essence of both title insurance and FSI.216
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Title insurance is coverage concerning risks of defects in legal title to real property. Robert
H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law 48 (3d ed. 2002). Home sellers represent ownership
of title to buyers and, when transferring their interest, provide buyers title insurance policies
backstopping this representation. If the seller breaches this representation, the insurer defends
the buyer’s claim of title against third parties and pays the buyer’s damages arising from the third
party’s successful assertion against the buyer’s title. Id. at 48--49.
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See James L. Gosdin, Title Insurance: A Comprehensive Overview 1 (2d ed. 2000) (“[A]
substantial part of title insurance cost generally [is] allocated to search, evaluation/examination,
or clearing underwriting objections.”).
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Costs make specific investigation infeasible for most insurance lines. FSI costs would not be
greater than current auditing practice costs. FSI-based auditing likely would be even more costeffective than traditional auditing exercises. See Alex Dontoh, Joshua Ronen & Bharat Sarath,
Financial Statements Insurance (Aug. 2, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with *the
Columbia Law Review) (providing formal proof of FSI’s relative efficiency).
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To illustrate further, consider how FSI resembles other new
insurance products that operate similarly to title insurance rather than
to liability or casualty insurance. Some involve a professional’s
opinion based on investigation that is, in turn, backed by insurance.
In tax opinion insurance, for example, a tax lawyer evaluates the tax
treatment of a proposed transaction;217 in fiduciary audit insurance,
an ERISA lawyer evaluates an ERISA plan’s compliance with law
and company policy. 218 Another example is representations and
warranties insurance, increasingly used in private mergers and
acquisitions.219 A seller represents that its financial statements fairly
present its performance and condition in conformity with GAAP; an
insurer engages an auditor to review the statements and backs the
representation with insurance.
FSI’s affinity with these nonliability insurance products
renders the analysis applicable to E&O insurance or self-insurance
inapt to FSI. Whatever the reasons for widespread audit industry
self-insurance---inability to pool and diversify the risk or other forms
of market failure---they do not carry over to FSI. After all, neither
E&O insurance nor even self-insurance bears any relation to
particular audit quality. But audit effectiveness and auditors’
reputations with management bear directly on financial statement
reliability and, under FSI, auditor examination and reports are
integral monitoring functions.
FSI also provides monitoring incentives on insurers that differ
from those insurers face when underwriting auditor E&O liability
insurance. In the latter case, umbrella policies cover a broad range of
217

See Kenneth A. Gary, New Opportunity for Tax Lawyers: Insuring Tax Transactions, 104
Tax Notes 26 (2004) (discussing proliferation of tax insurance); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law
Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 Va. Tax L. Rev. 339 (2005) (analyzing normative
appeal of tax insurance in context of characteristics of tax code).
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See Jeffrey D. Mamorsky & Terry L. Moore, Greenberg Traurig LLP, Fiducia ry Audit
Insurance: Risk Management for Post-Enron ERISA Compliance, GT Alert, June 2002, at 4,
available at http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/alerts/2002/mamorskyj_06a.asp (summarizing terms of
audit as condition to insurance eligibility).
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See Darian M. Ibrahim, The Unique Benefits of Treating Personal Goodwill as Property in
Corporate Acquisitions, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 41--42 (2005); Dale A. Oesterle, The Law of
Mergers and Acquisitions 289 (2d ed. 2002).
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auditor activities, including all audit engagements. For FSI, each
policy is tailored to a particular audit engagement with associated
risk, premium, coverage, and other tailored policy terms.220 With
FSI, specific financial statements may be uninsurable, but not the
entire auditing industry. 221
2. Promoting Competition --- In addition to the foregoing
structural advantages that FSI offers, FSI likely would improve
competition in the auditing industry. Liability risk and high
insurance costs constitute barriers to entry to otherwise potentially
viable competitors of the four large firms.222 High E&O costs may
be due to the fact that policies are insuring the auditor, based on
pooling and diversification models that implicitly assume no or
limited auditor ability to influence audit quality, financial statement
reliability, and risk of audit failure. But once auditors’ abilities are
recognized, a different model of backstopping the opinions emerges.
Tailored to the individual audit and specific financial statements, FSI
should reduce some barriers to entry that smaller firms otherwise
face from limitations on existing insurance markets.
FSI insurers entering the current environment would begin by
engaging auditors from the existing population of firms. So, for
example, AIG could hire Deloitte & Touche to audit Procter &
Gamble; and Chubb could hire Grant Thornton to audit Bojangles,
the mid-cap regional restaurant chain. The large four firms could, in
theory, maintain all existing work assignments, and the FSI insurers
could continue to hire the smaller firms to audit the minority of
public companies they currently audit. Ensuing dynamics could
change this allocation of assignments, however, and ignite
competition among audit service providers that should increase the
220
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number of alternatives available to FSI insurers beyond the current
crop.
Barriers of scale and expertise could persist. FSI’s effects on
these would depend on how FSI influences the related insurance
industry structure. FSI insurers could assemble in-house audit teams
or establish a network of captive audit firms along the lines of the
captive law firms that insurers currently use to provide insurance
defense work. If the resulting units generate the scale and expertise
to audit public companies, then FSI insurers would provide
competition directly to the current oligopoly. After all, there are
many more insurers capable of underwriting FSI than audit firms
capable of auditing large public companies,223 and they operate in a
highly competitive industry unlike the current auditing industry. 224
Prospects for overcoming barriers of scale and expertise seem more
likely in that market environment than in the current auditing market.
C. Comparison and Imperfections
FSI compares favorably to the current environment. FSI also
has its share of imperfections. The following summarizes the
comparisons and imperfections before concluding.
1. Recent Reforms. --- Recent reforms do not achieve any of
the objectives stated in the previous section. The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act and PCAOB address auditor independence by putting
supervisory authority in the hands of board audit committees rather
than in managers, restricting non-audit services, and enhancing
regulatory oversight. 225 These reforms may reduce audit failure, but
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The number of insurers offering E&O insurance to auditors has declined in recent years from
more than 100 to around ten. The Future of Auditing: Called to Account, supra note 12, at *
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indemnity to the major auditors [and] now there are ten.”).
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Top Twenty U.S. Property/Casualty Companies by Revenues, 2005, at
http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/industry (last visited Aug. 8, 2006) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
225

See supra text accompanying notes 41--43.
65

companies are still paying the auditor. Worse, auditor independence
standards may reduce the ability of small firms to compete and
increase a sense among the large four firms that they are too big to
fail. No reform offers a financial statement reliability index.
A leading academic proposal reinforces FSI’s appeal: Some
advocate strict auditor liability by establishing an ex ante damages
formula intended to raise the stakes auditors face for audit failure. 226
Proponents consciously attempt to make auditors act more like
insurers, an effort that FSI completes. The debate concerning how to
establish an appropriate damages formula also shows the difficulty in
implementing such quasi-insurance models.227 FSI solves the
damages measurement problem by using market-based policy
coverage that establishes predetermined caps on total payouts.
2. Continuing Limitations. --- FSI is not perfect. While
existing auditing market imperfections will endure or reappear in
different forms, FSI will shrink the frequency of such manifestations.
For example, under FSI, insurers and their auditors have incentives
to detect and correct discovered irregularities in any given year’s
audit. 228 But they may be tempted to suppress discoveries made in
later years covered by a previously issued policy. Yet auditors face
such temptations under the existing system, and FSI’s capacity to
improve audit effectiveness, produce transparent worst case
scenarios, and lower barriers to entry should all make this situation
arise less frequently. 229
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See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84
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Compare Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 5, at 346--53 (prescribing damages measured
as multiple of audit-engagement revenues to minimize risk of large awards inducing large firm
exits by bankruptcy), with Partnoy, Strict Liability, supra note 226, at 373--74 (contending that
damages measured as percentage of total losses would not pose meaningful bankruptcy risks).
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Another imperfection is skimming, the risk of a race to the
bottom among insurers to increase premium volume by offering
lenient audits. Again, kindred opinion shopping can occur in
existing audit practice. Under FSI, even if insurers wish to engage in
this practice, auditors would continue to face professional licensing
and SEC constraints that should interfere with such efforts.
Individual auditors continue to be licensed professionals with related
personal assets and reputation at stake, and this should make them
effective monitors---not only of management, but also of insurers.230
Conclusion
Suppose one of the large four audit firms faced imminent exit.
How would the government likely respond? Given doubts about
whether it would allow merger among two or more of them, 231 the
federal government’s decision not to pursue a criminal indictment
against KPMG, and a sense among some auditors that their firms are
too big to fail, what would the government likely do? Following a
well-traveled path, there is a reasonable basis for concern that the
government would intervene with financial support that would
enable the firm to survive or offer funds to provide compensation or
restitution to victims of audit failure.
But such alternatives are not appealing, in large part because
of the moral hazard they reinforce and also because the government
is likely not as good as private insurance markets at pricing risk or
otherwise managing it. 232 And government intervention is not the
only solution, even if E&O insurance for auditors is tight or
unavailable. For example, a variety of financial instruments traded
in capital markets increasingly are available to allocate risk of
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catastrophic loss from events such as terrorist attacks.233 Similar
tools can be developed to address financial statement risk. 234
Better yet would be to redesign the existing approach to
backstopping audits using financial statement insurance to cover
statements rather than auditors. As a credible alternative to the
existing auditing industry structure, a mandatory FSI program signals
to the large four audit firms that they are not too big to fail. This
neutralizes the moral hazard of auditors thinking that they are too big
to fail and provides a financial statement reliability index that is
unattainable under the current practice that relies upon a monotonic
three paragraph auditor report.
Finally, suppose that FSI is a second-best solution, compared
to the existing auditing industry model. Ironically, the very threat of
a credible alternative industry structure could support the existing
structure---and improve current practice---by reducing the risk of
audit firm exit and the corresponding market unraveling that might
otherwise lead to imposing the alternative or more radical measures
in the unreflective heat of crisis. Allowing Arthur Andersen to fail
left four large firms exposed to serious moral hazard from too big to
fail conceits. Creating a credible alternative to those four might just
save the industry from self-destruction.
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